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Despite the Georgian Dream’s democratic agenda to change Saakashvili’s authoritarian regime 
and its success in achieving the closest-ever relations with the European Union, the democratic 
quality in Georgia witnessed a decrease during the six-year period between 2013 and 2019. 
Georgia thus failed to make a historical move and deliver a genuine democratic system. 
Simultaneously, China – an external actor promoting authoritarianism – emerged in the region 
and since 2013 substantially strengthened relations with Georgia. The current scholarship fails 
to systematically and theoretically explain the Chinese impact on the democratic quality in 
Georgia. Hence, the aim of the following case study is to fill the existing research gap and 
analyse how China has affected the quality of democracy in Georgia during the 2013-2019 
period.  
The study is framed under the combined theoretical framework of the neo-Institutionalism and 
modified Linkage and Leverage analytical model. The dependent variable of the research is the 
degree of democracy and the independent variable – the degree of leverage. The study assesses 
the degrees of economic, political, and normative leverage to evaluate China’s impact on 
democracy in Georgia. Additionally, the analysis evaluates the European Union’s as well as 
Russian leverages to Georgia to avoid merely looking at correlation and instead to be able to 
demonstrate the causality between the democratic quality in Georgia and China’s leverage to 
Georgia. The research employs secondary statistical data collection and directed (deductive) 
qualitative content analysis to identify specific data and themes for the assessment of economic, 
political and normative leverages of China, the European Union and Russia to Georgia.  
The research results show that the Chinese leverage to Georgia has been low throughout the 
entire 2013-2019 period and has remained considerably lower than that of the European Union. 
The study reveals that China’s mechanisms of autocracy promotion in Georgia, i.e. socialisation 
and soft power, have not influenced the quality of democracy in Georgia during the period 
between the years 2013 and 2019. Thus, China has had no impact (or minimal) on the quality 
of democracy in Georgia. 
 





Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iii 
Author’s declaration .................................................................................................................. iv 
Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public ........................................... v 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of Content ...................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. x 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ xii 
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter 2 Literature Review .................................................................................................. 5 
2.1 Promotion of authoritarianism abroad by China .............................................................. 5 
2.1.1 Socialisation ............................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2 Soft power .................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 China’s influence on democracy in the EaP region ........................................................ 10 
2.3 China’s influence on democracy in Georgia .................................................................. 11 
2.4 Democracy and autocracy promotion by the EU and Russia ......................................... 13 
2.5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................... 17 
3.1 Competitive authoritarianism ......................................................................................... 17 
3.2 Promotion of authoritarianism and the black knights ..................................................... 20 
3.2 The neo-Institutionalist approach ................................................................................... 22 
3.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism .............................................................................. 23 
3.2.1 Sociological Institutionalism .................................................................................... 23 
3.2.1 Application of the Sociological and Rationalist Institutionalism framework .......... 25 
3.2.2 The analytical model of Linkage and Leverage ....................................................... 26 
ix 
 
3.2.2 Limitations and alteration of the Linkage and Leverage model .............................. 29 
   3.3 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology .................................................................... 35 
   4.1 Case selection and timeframe .......................................................................................... 35 
   4.2 The degree of democracy ................................................................................................ 37 
   4.3 The degree of leverage .................................................................................................... 39 
        4.3.1 Economic leverage .................................................................................................. 40 
 4.3.2 Political leverage ..................................................................................................... 41 
 4.3.3 Normative leverage ................................................................................................. 43 
   4.4 Data collection and analysis ............................................................................................ 44 
Chapter 5 Research Results and Discussion ........................................................................ 47 
   5.1 Economic leverage .......................................................................................................... 47 
5.1.1 Export ....................................................................................................................... 47 
5.1.2 Import ....................................................................................................................... 49 
5.1.2 Foreign direct investment ......................................................................................... 50 
5.1.3 Summary .................................................................................................................. 52 
   5.2 Political leverage ............................................................................................................. 53 
5.2.1 Civilian-military presence ........................................................................................ 53 
5.2.2 Diplomatic assistance ............................................................................................... 56 
5.2.2 Membership in regional organisations ..................................................................... 59 
5.2.3 Summary .................................................................................................................. 60 
   5.3 Normative leverage ......................................................................................................... 62 
   5.4 The overall degrees of leverage ...................................................................................... 66 
Chapter 6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 70 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 73 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................... 91 
x 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Regime types .............................................................................................................. 18 
Table 2 Economic leverage ..................................................................................................... 40 
Table 3 Calculation of economic leverage degrees ................................................................. 41 
Table 4 Political leverage ........................................................................................................ 42 
Table 5 Normative leverage .................................................................................................... 43 
Table 6 Georgia’s membership in regional organisations ....................................................... 60 
Table 7 Measurement of the degrees of Chinese, the EU and Russian political leverage to 
Georgia ..................................................................................................................................... 61 
















List of Figures  
Figure 1 External democratic and authoritarian influences on competitive authoritarian regimes
 .................................................................................................................................................. 19 
Figure 2 The democracy index in Georgia .............................................................................. 20 
Figure 3 China’s strategies of autocracy promotion and their instrumentalisation through 
leverages ................................................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 4 The amount of Georgian export to China, the EU and Russia .................................. 48 
Figure 5 The amount of Georgia’s import from China, the EU and Russia ............................ 50 
Figure 6 The amount of Chinese, the EU and Russian FDI in Georgia .................................. 51 
Figure 7 Dynamics of the degrees of economic leverage of China, the EU and Russia to 
Georgia ..................................................................................................................................... 52 
Figure 8 Dynamics of the degrees of political leverage of China, the EU and Russia to 
Georgia ..................................................................................................................................... 62 
Figure 9 The degrees of leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia ............................ 67 












List of Abbreviations  
AA – Association Agreement 
AIIB – Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation 
BRI – Belt and Road Initiative  
CCP – Chinese Communist Party  
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe  
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization  
DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement  
EC – European Commission 
EP – European Parliament  
EEU – Eurasian Economic Union 
EU – European Union 
EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission  
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment  
FTA – Free Trade Agreement  
GD – Georgian Dream 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
LL – Linkage and Leverage  
xiii 
 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
OBOR – One Belt One Road (Initiative)  
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
RCI – Rational Choice Institutionalism 
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SI – Sociological Institutionalism  
SREB – Silk Road Economic Belt  
UN – United Nations 
US – United States of America  











Chapter 1. Introduction  
After the 2012 October elections, the Georgian Dream (GD) party came to power with a 
democratic agenda in Georgia. (Radio Liberty 2012) In the following year, the quality of 
democracy recovered substantially compared to the previous years. (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2012; 2013) The newly elected incumbents continued the former 
government’s pro-Euro-Atlantic foreign policy direction and in 2014 signed the Association 
Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) as a sovereign choice of the state. (Civil 
Georgia 2014) Within the AA, the Georgian government agreed to pursue the AA agenda to 
strengthen the rule of law, reform judiciary system, fight against corruption, protect human 
rights and freedoms and strengthen democratic institutions. The AA in return entailed the Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and visa-free travel within the EU for 
Georgian citizens. (European Union External Action 2018) Thus, EU-Georgia relations became 
as close as never before. Despite these changes, throughout the following six years, the 
democratic quality started to decrease. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012; 2019) Thus, Georgia 
failed to make a historic move from the list of hybrid regimes to democracies.  
Simultaneously, after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the Chinese foreign policy objectives, 
which had a low profile of the engagement in international politics, suddenly showed dramatic 
shifts. (Kaczmarski et al, 2019: 11) These changes followed the global economic crisis, which 
China efficiently managed to weather, having become the second-largest economy in the world 
only after the US. (The New York Times 2010) This success surged the confidence of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for devising a new strategy to boost China’s international 
profile. Thus, in 2013, President Xi introduced ambitious plans into the country’s foreign policy 
strategy with the intrinsic idea of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a mega project aimed to 
‘shorten the distance between China and Europe’ (The Guardian 2017) and to achieve economic 
growth, greater global political impact and addressing security concerns. (Eder 2018: 13)  
Since the introduction of the new strategy, China’s engagement with the wider Eurasian region 
increased considerably. Thus, Georgia, as a natural geographic crossroad between Europe and 
Asia, acquired much of a significance. Having seen this opportunity, which complied with their 
strategies to use the geographic location as an opportunity in fostering peace in the region, the 
GD incumbents started to actively support the Chinese BRI. (The Diplomat 2016) Thus, 
economic as well as diplomatic relations between the two countries began to deepen. (Larsen 
2017: 4) In 2013, China and Georgia signed an Agreement on Technical and Financial 
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Cooperation to enhance ‘friendly relations between the two countries’. (Legislative Herald of 
Georgia 2013) Following that, Georgia joined the BRI by concluding the Memorandum of 
Cooperation with China. (Charaia et al, 2020: 19) In 2018, Georgia became the first country 
among the post-Soviet as well as Eastern Partnership (EaP) states to conclude the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with Beijing. (Emerging Europe 2018) Thus, as a result of the growing 
relations, approximately 30 Chinese companies started to cooperate with Georgia in the spheres 
of infrastructure, energy, finances, agriculture, free industrial zones, logistics, 
telecommunications, etc. (Charaia et al, 2020: 5) Having seen an opportunity in closer 
engagement with China, the Georgian government started to host the Silk Road Forum in Tbilisi 
once in two years since 2015. (Forbes 2019) In 2019, the forum hosted more than 2000 
delegates from around 60 countries. (Charaia et al, 2020: 32) 
China’s influence on democracy in Eurasia has been addressed by a number of scholars. The 
literature on growing Sino-Georgia relations, however, has been largely overlooked China’s 
impact on the democratic quality in Georgia. Despite increasing in number, the studies have 
remained undertheorised. Hence, the broader literature exhibits conceptual gaps and empirical 
limitations. The studies are not built on theoretical and analytical mechanisms, and their nature 
is widely semi-academic, being based on the authors’ inductive assumptions without employing 
much of empirical evidence.  
Furthermore, the preponderance of works on Chinese influences on Georgian domestic and 
foreign policies demonstrates another gap with regard to unsystematic research on the EaP or 
post-Soviet region at large, making the studies more generic and assumptive. Apart from that, 
the claims of the studies vary considerably and are sometimes contradictory. While Georgian 
authors argue that China does not and will not impact the democratic quality in Georgia (Papava 
and Charaia 2017; Papava 2017), the international scholars claim the opposite. (Makocki 2017; 
Makocki 2018; Eder 2018; Kaczmarski et al, 2019)  
The following research tries to narrow the existing research gaps in the literature, i.e. the lack 
of empiricism and theorisation, and explore how China has affected the democratic quality in 
Georgia during the period between the years 2013 and 2019. Thus, the objective of the thesis is 
to answer the following main research question: 
Q: How does China influence the degree of democracy in Georgia?  
The following study is based on empirical evidence and is framed under the combined analytical 
framework of neo-Institutionalist theories, i.e. Rational Choice and Sociological 
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Institutionalism, and analytical model of the Linkage and Leverage (LL).1 Drawing on the 
abundant literature on autocracy promotion, China is regarded as an actor promoting 
authoritarianism abroad in the following thesis.  
According to the theoretical framework of Rationalist and Sociological Institutionalism, 
strategies of autocracy promotion are instrumentalised through leverage. Thus, the study 
assesses China’s leverage to Georgia throughout the period between 2013 and 2019.2 
Evaluating the degrees of leverage reveals the degree of Georgia’s vulnerability (dependence) 
on China and to what extent the latter has hindered democracy in the former throughout the 
period under the study. The LL model is modified based on studies on the promotion of 
authoritarianism, which employ this analytical framework. (Lebanidze 2019; Lebanidze and 
Grigalashvili 2018) Thus, the thesis answers the question: 
Q1: What are the degrees of China’s political, economic, and normative leverage to Georgia?  
Answering this question, the study reveals how strong China’s strategies of autocracy 
promotion are in Georgia and whether a causal inference can be argued between the democracy 
degree in Georgia and China’s leverage to Georgia. With the purpose to avoid illustrating a 
mere correlation, the research assesses the leverage degrees of other regional actors, which in 
the broader literature promote democratic or authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet region – 
the EU and Russia, respectively. In order to claim that China influences the democratic quality 
in Georgia, the independent and dependent variables need to demonstrate correlation, and the 
Chinese leverage to Georgia should outscore that of the EU as well as Russia. Thus, the thesis 
answers the following questions as well:  
Q2: What are the degrees of the EU’s political, economic, and normative leverage to Georgia?  
Q3: What are the degrees of Russia’s political, economic, and normative leverage to Georgia?  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. While the following first chapter introduces the study 
and its objective, the second chapter provides a discussion of the literature on the topic and 
identifies the research gap. The objective of the state of art is to provide existing knowledge 
concerning the subject, promotion of authoritarianism by China, its strategies and impact on the 
EaP region and Georgia. The review looks at other actors which promote democracy and/or 
 
1 The analytical framework of Linkage and Leverage is altered in the study. (See chapter 3) 
2 See chapter 3  
4 
 
authoritarianism in the post-Soviet region, such as the EU and Russia. Consequently, the 
chapter introduces the research problem, which is addressed in the thesis. 
The third chapter of the study evolves around the existing theoretical issues pertaining to the 
regime trajectories and democracy quality changes in the post-Soviet states. Initially, the first 
section discusses the concept of competitive authoritarianism and its importance for studying 
changes in the democratic quality in the post-Soviet states. After that, the second section 
introduces the concepts of autocracy promotion and the black knights, which have immense 
significance for understanding the variation of democracy. The third and fourth sections 
introduce the theories of Rational Choice (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and the 
analytical model of Linkage and Leverage (LL), which is applied to the research in a modified 
form. After the introduction of the LL analytical model, the fourth section explains the alteration 
of the model and its benefits for studying the external actors’ democratic as well as authoritarian 
influences on the democratic quality in Georgia.  
The fourth chapter introduces the research design and methodology employed in the thesis. The 
first section discusses the case selection and timeframe. The next section provides 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the dependent variable – the degree of democracy. 
The first section also provides a discussion on the democracy concept and the approach of 
democracy degree assessment employed in the study. The third section presents the independent 
variable of the study – the degree of leverage – and explores its categories (economic, political, 
normative) and their operationalisation. The last section of the chapter presents the data 
collection methods.  
Thereafter, the fifth chapter discusses the research results and addresses the research question 
– how does China affect the quality of democracy in Georgia? The study assesses China’s 
leverage to Georgia and thus answers the main research question. Lastly, the thesis reveals the 
(non)causality between the dependent and independent variables, i.e. the degree of democracy 
in Georgia and China’s leverage to Georgia. The last chapter draws conclusions and summarises 







Chapter 2. Literature Review 
The following chapter explores the broader literature on the promotion of authoritarianism by 
China. The first section of the chapter explores the scholarship on the autocracy promotion by 
China abroad. The section presents studies addressing the Chinese domestic and foreign policy 
goals, which are key to understanding why China promotes authoritarian regime. The section 
also reviews the literature concerning China’s strategies of autocracy promotion. 
After reviewing China’s autocracy promotion abroad, the second and fourth sections of the 
chapter focus on the literature regarding the Chinese influence on democracy in the EaP region 
and Georgia. The following sections look at the scholarship on democratic and authoritarian 
regime promotion by the EU and Russia, respectively. The last part of the chapter briefly 
summarises the review and identifies existing research gaps in the literature and the main puzzle 
of the study.  
 
2.1 Promotion of authoritarianism abroad by China  
In the late 1970s, after the death of Mao Zedong, a new leadership led by Deng Xiaoping opted 
for the change of the revolutionary agenda in the Chinese foreign policy, so that it was in 
compliance with a domestic reformatory policy. The country’s foreign policy became a tool for 
the Communist Party to remain in power. Jiang Zemin, who co-appointed Xiaoping, stated, 
‘China should bide its time, hide its brightness, not seek leadership, but do certain things.’ 
(Shambaugh 2013: 18-19) China started to transform domestically but kept a low international 
profile. The turning point in the situation was the beginning of the 2000s when the ruling party 
started to immerse the state in multilateral cooperation with neighbouring states in the 
framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). While keeping away from military alliances, China intended 
to pursue diplomacy for the sake of economic aspirations. Thus, the government sought for 
establishing bilateral economic relations and finding new markets for the Chinese export. 
(Kaczmarski et al, 2019: 11) 
In 2008-2009, the world witnessed the global economic crisis, which had a game-changer 
impact on China’s foreign policy. The crisis affected the country only negligibly and as a result, 
having become the second-largest economy in the world after the United States (US), the ruling 
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party’s confidence surged for devising a new strategy to enhance China’s international status. 
(Hameiri and Jones 2016: 72-98) 
In 2012, Xi Jinping came to power and changed the country’s foreign policy strategy, which 
previously was utterly limited in terms of engagement in international politics. The new 
president restructured institutions and further centralised policymaking processes. Xi 
introduced an ambitious plan into the country’s international agenda with the central idea of 
‘Greater Eurasia’ to achieve economic growth and greater international political impact (Eder 
2018: 13), aiming at circumventing democratising impact from the West. (Bader 2015: 24- 25) 
Thus, in 2013, Beijing started to promote the new vision of the Silk Road, embodied through 
the BRI, for connecting to countries in the neighbourhood as well as wider Eurasia and 
eventually to Europe. The initiative soon became an intrinsic part of the Chinese foreign policy 
with the aim of developing infrastructure between China and Europe to promote China’s 
intentions internationally. (Hong’e 2017) Beijing created additional instruments and 
multilateral institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk 
Road Fund in order to facilitate the execution of this ambitious plan. (Makocki 2018: 3) The 
CCP has expected to achieve security in the region, maintaining high economic growth as well 
as regime stability and international status as a regional power in Eurasian. (Blackwill and Tellis 
2015: 10-17)  
China’s foreign strategies, for the most part, pertain to the country’s domestic politics. 
(Kaczmarski et al, 2019: 10) China’s ruling party has a rationale to rival democracy promotion 
since it is problematic for the authoritarian governing system. Hence, it countervails democratic 
values and norms that promote Western interventions into autocratic states and by doing so, it 
supports regime stability abroad and fosters persistence of authoritarian states’ blocks. (Bader 
2015: 24) For instance, China often rejects resolutions of the UN (United Nations) Security 
Council pertaining to autocratic regimes. (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008) The CCP’s major 
objective is to maintain the regime and ruling elites’ legitimacy within China. Thus, the foreign 
policy goals largely derive from these domestic factors and provide an effective environment 
for the internal legitimacy of the ruling party. The protection of the country’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity is perceived as non-interference in domestic politics. (Kaczmarski et al, 
2019: 10)  
The CCP represents a non-democratic approach to governance, which sees the threat in 
democracy diffusion and pressure from the West. (Gat 2007) Hence, the party has been actively 
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promoting authoritarianism in the Eurasian region, especially since the Colour Revolutions in 
the post-Soviet countries. For instance, as a response to these revolutions in the former Soviet 
space, the incumbent CCP toughened the restrictions on non-governmental organisations inside 
China. (Wilson 2009: 373) The country, similarly to Russia, started to utilise regional 
organisations and initiatives for this purpose, for instance, the SCO and ASEAN. (Ambrosio 
2010) The scholarship on the promotion of authoritarianism argues that China actively supports 
autocratic regimes and hinders their democratisation in the region. (Burnell 2010; Gat 2007)  
Unlike the 20th century, when democracy was threatened by communist and fascist autocrats 
with aggressive means, nowadays autocracy promoting actors, such as China and even Russia, 
choose to shift global conditions in a way that the promotion of democracy becomes difficult 
and incumbents’ capacity to pursue their autocratic agenda in third states is boosted. (Ambrosio 
2012: 385; Obedynkova and Libman 2015: 2) Thus, autocracy promotion through alternative 
support strengthens fully authoritarian but also competitive authoritarian regime incumbents, 
who already display authoritarian ‘tendencies and practices’. (Ambrosio 2010: 377- 378) These 
autocratic external actors – the black knights – become role models for other states to follow. 
Hence, enjoying the authoritarian support from the black knights, the Western democratising 
influence on target states decreases and as a result, democratising efforts fail to bring changes. 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 41)  
Some scholars argue that China does not promote autocracy and merely countervails political 
instability and shortcomings in the region, following its own pragmatic economic, political and 
security goals. (Bader et al, 2010: 82) However, even in this case with this pragmatic approach, 
Beijing still leans towards promoting autocracy, since it impacts the balance between contesting 
political parties in third states and favours autocrats. (Bader 2015: 24) The official Chinese 
rhetoric also asserts that Beijing does not interfere in third states’ domestic politics, albeit it 
supports incumbents by resources and development projects, stabilising semi-authoritarian and 
authoritarian regimes. (Bader 2015:  25)  
 
2.1.1 Socialisation  
The growing literature on autocracy promotion by China is largely framed under the neo-
Institutionalist theory, according to which, there are two strategies which China pursues to 
promote authoritarianism abroad: socialisation (integration) and diffusion of norms (soft 
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power). These strategies are China’s efforts to closely integrate with third states and to promote 
authoritarian norms and values internationally. (Schweickert et al, 2012; Ambrosio 2010; 2012) 
It is argued that China does not utilise hard power or conditionality in the Eurasian region, 
unlike Russia. (Ambrosio 2010: 376) On the contrary, Beijing opts for using ‘peaceful’ political 
support and economic cooperation, which are referred to as socialisation strategies. 
(Schweickert et al, 2012: 6) Socialisation follows the logic of appropriateness and implies 
establishing economic and political ties with target states. (Schweickert et al, 2012: 3- 4)  
China, as a powerful agent, shifts the international norms through political ties with target 
states. (Pu 2012: 347) For instance, Beijing, along with Russia, has deepened the 
institutionalisation of the SCO, which aims at delegitimising democracy promotion and 
protecting autocratic incumbents in the organisation’s member-states. (Ambrosio 2009: 9) 
Thus, one of the major aims of political integration is to shift third states’ normative preferences 
through regional organisations and institutions, such as the SCO. (Pu 2012: 355- 358; Diamond 
et al, 2016: 30- 31) For instance, China invited Azerbaijan and Armenia to the SCO as dialogue 
partners, which was also aimed at halting the influence of Western organisations on both states. 
(Eder 2018: 17- 19) Through the SCO, the CCP seeks to maintain the status quo of 
(semi)authoritarian regimes in the Eurasian region. (Ambrosio 2008: 1341)  
Apart from political integration, China pursues establishing dense economic ties in order to 
increase its economic leverage to target states, for instance, through bilateral trade. 
(Schweickert et al, 2012: 17) This strategy is often referred to as the ‘doing-business’ approach. 
(Ambrosio 2012: 382) Bader (2015: 24) argues that in order to sustain the regime and 
circumvent Western democratising ‘dominos’, the CCP utilises close political as well as 
economic ties with states in the Eurasian region. Establishing and strengthening relations with 
target states is aimed at undermining democratisation processes and thus keeping the Western 
democracy reinforcing influence as weak as possible. (Chen and Kinzelbach 2014: 401)  
 
2.1.2 Soft Power  
The broad literature on autocracy diffusion claims that the regime is promoted from China, even 
if Beijing does not have any intention. (Burnell 2010) This type of autocracy promotion, 
according to Obydenkova and Libman (2015), is an ‘unintended’ type of promotion. In this 
context, ‘prestigious’ states with huge economic and military capabilities (Gilpin 1981: 3), such 
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as China, utilise their ‘enough weight’ and try to lead third states towards accepting certain 
authoritarian values or norms. (Ambrosio 2010: 386- 387; Gat 2007) The possibility of 
normative adoptions by target states increases when the ties are strong (Levitsky and Way 2014: 
152), and external policies are deemed efficient, even if they do not fit target states’ domestic 
conditions. (Florini 1996: 375) Thus, China’s increasing international prominence and immense 
soft power are aimed at becoming a normative role model for other states. (Ambrosio 2010: 
387)  
China has achieved economic growth and successfully circumvented democratising pressures. 
It has not only rejected democracy and countervailed global democracy promotion, but 
‘reinvigorated a rival model of development with clear international appeal, a strong-hand 
approach to political and economic modernisation.’ (Gerrits 2008: 14) Hence, China promotes 
authoritarian norms through strengthening its soft power to become a role model for third 
country incumbents. (Cooley 2015) 
The Chinese authoritarian ruling system consists of autocracy and a market economy – ‘illiberal 
capitalism’, which rivals democracy globally. (Barma and Ratner 2006: 57) The CCP has 
utilised economic growth in China along with social and political order and established the so-
called ‘China model’ or ‘Beijing Consensus’, which serves as an alternative to the democratic 
path to development. (Ambrosio 2010: 382; Ambrosio 2012: 383) The Beijing Consensus 
became an alternative model after the CPP managed to smoothly overcome the 2007-2009 
Great Recession as opposed to the West, which struggled to weather the crisis a great deal. 
(Zhao 2010: 433) The model has been praised by a number of governments around the world. 
(Ambrosio 2010: 382) Thus, the ruling party has pursued a strategy to enhance its influence 
(Kurlantzick 2007: 5) and to gain a ‘soft power appeal’ globally. (Cooley 2015: 58- 60) Even 
the Russian government per se has sought to follow the Chinese way of promotion of 
authoritarianism. (Levy 2009) The spread of the Chinese authoritarian model is not led by 
coercion or conditionality, but the Chinese success, which makes it be deemed a role model by 
third states’ incumbents. (Ambrosio 2010: 383) According to Börzel (2015: 7), China opts to 
increase its soft power since it can be more attractive for target states than the direct promotion 






2.2 China’s influence on democracy in the EaP region 
There is thin literature on autocracy promotion by China in the EaP region, which explores 
whether China influences regimes in the region. The majority of the studies are semi-academic 
and lack theoretical framework and empiricism. In this regard, the study of Kaczmarski et al. 
(2017) is the most systematic. The research is framed under the theory of Limited Access Orders 
(LAO) and Open Access Orders (OAO) to explain China’s influence in the EaP states. 
According to this approach, the countries under the interaction of other powers are influenced 
and become more closed politically and economically or opened in the same terms. If the 
interaction is unequal with a politically and economically more powerful state, the influence is 
more extensive and makes a less powerful country more similar to the political regime of the 
stronger state. (Kaczmarski et al, 2019: 6) 
Kaczmarski et al. argue (2019) that China’s expansion across the EaP region leads to benefits 
as well as challenges with regard to the states’ democratic quality. The article examines two 
cases of Ukraine and Belarus to explore the Chinese impact on the social and political orders. 
China is an unbalanced closure limited access order, a politically closed and economically open 
actor, supporting countries’ economic openness due to the BRI’s economic aims. (Kaczmarski 
et al, 2019) 
China supports the idea of balancing the EU and Russia with regard to politics and security and 
diversification of the economy. That is why Beijing has criticised Ukraine’s pro-Western 
political direction pursued after the Maidan, and it has supported Belarus’ more ‘balancing 
strategy’. (Kaczmarski et al, 2019: 18) China’s economic engagement with the EaP countries 
is not very large. Therefore, the country’s influence on these states’ domestic policies is 
somewhat limited. The mechanisms of influence are indirect and pertain to the governments 
and their economic policies. Beijing fosters economic reforms which are not in line with those 
of the EU since the latter supports economic efficiency by raising market competition and 
openness of countries’ economies. (Kaczmarski et al, 2019) 
Other semi-academic studies exploring China’s impact on democratic quality in the EaP region 
present a similar perspective on the incompatibility of Chinese companies with liberal and 
democratic values supported by the EU in the region. China-funded projects counter democratic 
norms, which the EaP states are ‘signed up to’ under the AA agenda. (Makocki 2017: 2) They 
tend to involve corruption and strengthen the influence of oligarchs. For instance, Chinese 
company COVEC, which built a road in Poland, demanded the exemption from labour law for 
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its workers. (Makocki 2017: 2) Moreover, being supportive of authoritarian regimes, China 
does not favour democracy and democratic transitions through revolutions. Thus, the CCP tries 
to reduce the Western influence through FDI in hybrid regimes of the EaP states. The 
investment projects are not transparent and counter good governance and the rule of law. These 
economic endeavours continue to challenge democratic reforms and policies in the region. 
(Rolland 2018) 
Another perspective for explaining China’s negative influence on democracy in the EaP region 
focuses on China’s close relations with Russia. According to Makocki (2017: 3; 2018: 27), the 
Chinese approach towards the EaP is ‘a double-edged sword’, meaning that Beijing’s close 
political and security relations with Russia and its acknowledgement of the Kremlin’s interests 
in the EaP largely hinder the region’s democratisation. For instance, despite China’s aid to 
Ukraine to circumvent the Russian transit ban, the Chinese construction companies participated 
in building a bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea. (Makocki 2017: 3) Furthermore, 
China did not allow Ukraine and Moldova to join the 16+1 initiative, which could have led to 
the states’ further integration with the EU-member Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. (Makocki 2017: 3) 
Another strand of the literature introduces a new approach which puts the emphasis on the 
economic vulnerability of the EaP states towards China. This semi-academic literature claims 
that while China’s active engagement is beneficial, the EaP states’ economic as well as political 
vulnerability to China increases. Thus, they can become excessively dependent on Beijing due 
to having immense debts, which undermines their democratic reforms. (Eder 2018) The BRI is 
a geostrategic project, which can influence the EaP countries’ foreign policy directions, hinder 
the region’s integration with the EU and democratic development. (Smolnik 2018) The CCP 
has an ambitious plan under the framework of the BRI to dominate the Eurasian continent, 
which affects geopolitical reality in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. China aims at 
undermining the Western influence in Eurasia. (Rolland 2018)  
 
2.3 China’s influence on democracy in Georgia  
Apart from the literature on China’s influence on the EaP states’ democracy quality, there are 
growing semi-academic studies discussing China’s impact on democracy in Georgia. The 
papers, for the most part, concentrate on the economic aspects of Sino-Georgian relations. It is 
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worthwhile to mention that the literature mainly emerged between 2017 and 2018, during the 
period when Georgia and China concluded the FTA. (Emerging Europe 2018)  
One of the major approaches of the discussion on China’s influence on the quality of democracy 
in Georgia, emphasises China’s rapprochement with Russia and their regional competition with 
the EU. The studies argue that due to high compatibility between the Russian and Chinese 
interests in the Eurasian region (Papava and Charaia 2017; Mailyan 2015), the two actors can 
merge the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and BRI under a single initiative. (Papava 2017) 
From this perspective, China’s active engagement with Georgia can lead to negative effects on 
the country’s democratic quality. (Papava and Charaia 2017) Thus, the GD’s pursuit of 
strengthening ties with China undermines Georgia’s domestic doctrine regarding the 
democratic and pro-Western orientation of the nation. Georgia will find it hard to find the modus 
vivendi between the previous (Saakashvili’s) pro-European direction of foreign policy and the 
engagement in Chinese economic initiatives. (Mailyan 2015) 
On the contrary to the previous approach, the similar studies argue that while Russia’s main 
ambition is geopolitical, economic objectives remain the priority for Beijing. Even though the 
CCP recognises the post-Soviet states as Russia’s sphere of interests, the ruling party does not 
follow Mackinder’s Heartland theory and thus, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) does 
encompass norms and limitations to impose on the participant countries of the project, such as 
Georgia. Beijing displays interests towards infrastructural investments, bolstering the 
development of communication and transportation with the EU through the Batumi, Poti and 
Anaklia3 ports. (Papava and Charaia 2017) 
Furthermore, the same strand of the literature argues that Russia has no capacity to shift China’s 
economic interests towards geopolitics. This is because Beijing is economically much stronger 
than Moscow, and therefore, Russian cannot influence the Chinese foreign policy. (Papava and 
Charaia 2017) Furthermore, the CCP has been strengthening relations with the EU, and it is 
unlikely that the party pairs with Moscow to pose a threat together against the EU and its 
democracy reinforcing influence in the EaP countries. (Dijk and Martens 2016) Apart from that, 
having concluded the FTA with Georgia, China merely aims at investing in the country. Hence, 
 
3 The construction of the Anaklia Port has not yet finished. On 9th January, the government of Georgia cancelled 
the deal with the Anaklia Development Consortium and the implementation of the project has been postponed for 




China and Georgia are equal partners, despite the fact that they are different-sized countries. 
This means that the former does not impact the latter’s domestic policies. (Charaia et al, 2018) 
China’s geopolitical aim is to adapt the multipolar world tendencies, i.e. to decrease the US 
global influence, which does not necessarily imply promoting authoritarianism in Georgia. 
(Larsen 2017)  
Larsen (2017) presents another perspective claiming that China does not have any influence on 
Georgia’s democratic quality, focusing on Georgia’s diversification of trade and economic ties 
and geographic distance. Although Georgia is an extremely small country in comparison with 
China, the risk that Georgia similarly to the Asian small states becomes politically 
overdependent on China is very low due to immense distance between the two countries and 
Georgia’s close economic relations with other actors.  
 
2.4 Democracy and autocracy promotion by the EU and Russia  
Unlike the Chinese influence on the democratic quality in the former Soviet states, the literature 
has given much attention to the EU and Russia. The scholarship on the promotion of democracy 
and authoritarianism views the EU as a democracy reinforcing power, while Russia is deemed 
an autocracy promoting actor in post-Soviet space. (Levitsky and Way 2010; Lebanidze 2019; 
Schweickert et al, 2012; Ambrosio 2009) The following section will briefly discuss the 
democracy and autocracy promotion by the EU and Russia in the post-Soviet space, 
respectively.  
The EU’s main interest towards its eastern neighbouring post-Soviet states is ‘to strengthen the 
prosperity and stability’, which serves to boost the EU’s security. (Council of the European 
Union 2009: 23) The EU perceives state failure, social instability and regional conflicts as 
security threats. (Council of the European Union 2009: 23- 30) In order to increase its security, 
the EU looks for partnership and cooperation with the former Soviet states in its neighbourhood. 
This cooperation is undertaken on the basis of democratic values, such as human rights and rule 
of law. (Council of the European Union 2009: 23)  
The EU has several strategies to promote democracy in the post-Soviet space/EaP. These 
strategies are political dialogue and soft power. (Lebanidze 2019: 182, 186- 187; Börzel 2010; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) The democratising strategies not only led to the 
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democratisation of the 2004 EU enlargement states but targets states in the EU’s neighbourhood 
as well. (Gawrich et al, 2009)  
The EU’s main democratising power – conditionality – is often criticised by some scholars due 
to the absence of the membership prospective for the states in its neighbourhood. 
(Schimmelfennig 2005) Thus, conditionality beyond the EU borders is weak or almost non-
existent. (Lebanidze 2019: 21)  
Political dialogue is a type of democracy diffusion and follows the logic of appropriateness, 
which is explained by Sociological Institutionalism. (Börzel and Risse 2000: 7) Through this 
strategy, the EU aims at promoting its democratic values in neighbouring post-Soviet states. 
(Börzel and Pamuk 2011: 19- 20) Due to the weakness of the EU’s conditionality beyond the 
organisation, the EU actively employs political dialogue (Börzel and Pamuk 2011: 10) to 
promote democratic values as the fundamental norms for cooperation with its neighbours. The 
example of political dialogue is the process of AA ratification with Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Georgia. (Lebanidze 2019: 22) 
As opposed to the EU, as it was aforesaid, the broader literature considers Russia as an 
autocracy promoting power. (Levitsky and Way 2010; Ambrosio 2009; Tolstrup 2009; 
Obydenkova and Libman 2015) Russia perceives the post-Soviet states as the ‘zone of 
privileged interests’. (Ambrosio 2012: 383; Schweickert et al, 2012: 4) Thus, the Russian 
government’s objective is to maintain the former Soviet states’ high economic and political 
dependence on Moscow. The Kremlin’s main foreign policy goal is to avoid the Western 
democratising influence and spread of Colour Revolutions in its neighbourhood as well as the 
wider Eurasian region. (Lebanidze 2019: 182, 185) For instance, NATO is deemed the major 
threat in the Russian National Security Concept document, perceiving itself as a ‘power-centre’ 
in the international multipolar system. (Lebanidze 2019: 129) Russia established regional 
organisations, such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), EEU, the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Lebanidze 2019: 128, 293- 294) to promote 
authoritarianism and rival the democratising influences. (Schweickert et al, 2012: 4- 5)  
Russia employs strategies to destabilise ‘disobedient regimes’. (Lebanidze 2019: 186) The actor 
utilises conditionality to change third states’ incumbents’ decisions. Conditionality follows the 
logic of consequences and aims at shifting the ruling parties’ preferences through incentives 
(‘carrots’) or coercion (‘sticks’). (Schweickert et al, 2012) For instance, Russia utilised its 
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coercive ‘sticks’ against Georgia in 2008 and employed ‘carrots’ of energy subsidies in 
different post-Soviet states. (Lebanidze 2019: 183)  
As for the strategy of diffusion of norms (soft power), there is a debate in the literature in this 
regard. Some scholars argue that Russia promotes authoritarianism and non-democratic values 
abroad through its soft power. (Ambrosio 2009; Schweickert et al, 2012) Others agree that 
Russia has a negative impact on democratic quality, albeit they argue that Russia does not aim 
at spreading authoritarian values abroad through its normative power. (Way 2015) Lebanidze 
(2019: 183) mentions that, when Russian coercive power in Georgia and Ukraine did not bring 
desired results for the Kremlin, the latter did not have soft power tools to employ instead of 
opting for other coercive instruments. 
 
2.5 Conclusions  
The chapter reviewed the abundant literature on autocracy promotion by China and its influence 
on the democratic quality in the EaP region and Georgia. The chapter also presented the 
literature on democracy and autocracy regime promotion by the EU and Russia. 
The state of art showed that there is a broad literature on the promotion of authoritarianism by 
China. The studies are mainly framed under the Institutionalist approach since it addresses the 
autocracy promotion strategies following the logic of appropriateness. These strategies are 
socialisation (integration) and the diffusion of autocratic norms through soft power.  
As for China’s influence on democratic quality in the EaP as well as Georgia, there is a growing 
number of studies which remain undertheorised. The literature shows conceptual as well as 
empirical limitations with regard to analysing China’s influence in Georgia as well as the EaP 
at large. The majority of papers are not based on comprehensive theoretical and analytical 
mechanisms. Thus, the preponderance of the studies are semi-academic and are primarily based 
on the authors’ inductive assumptions.  
In addition, a large number of works do not employ empirical data and are generic. There are 
contrasting arguments in the papers. For instance, the Georgian authors claim that China does 
not affect democracy in Georgia (Papava and Charaia 2017; Papava 2017) as opposed to the 
foreign scholars, who argue the opposite. (Makocki 2017; Makocki 2018; Eder 2018; 
Kaczmarski et al, 2019) Apart from that, the major foci of the research pertain to the discussion 
on China’s influence through economic perspectives. Normative and political aspects remain 
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rather understudied. The following study tries to address the existing research gaps in the 
literature and analyse how China affects the democratic quality in Georgia from economic, 























Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework 
The following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis. The first section of 
the chapter presents the concept of competitive authoritarianism and its importance for 
understanding changes in the quality of democracy. The second section introduces the concepts 
of authoritarian promotion and the black knights, which are central in studying changes of 
regimes and quality of democracy. The third section presents the neo-Institutionalist approach, 
i.e. the theories of Sociological and Rational Choice Institutionalism, which will be applied to 
the study. The neo-Institutionalist theories see the international environment, i.e. external 
influence, as a determinant factor, explaining changes in democratic quality. (Bulmer 2008: 56)  
After introducing the new Institutionalist approach, the chapter presents the analytical model 
of Linkage and Leverage, which evaluates external influences on changes in the quality of 
democracy. The combination of the neo-Institutionalist theories and the analytical model of 
Linkage and Leverage will serve to evaluate Chinese, Russian and the EU’s influence on the 
degree of democracy in Georgia. 
 
3.1 Competitive authoritarianism  
Competitive authoritarianism is an important concept for understanding changes in democratic 
quality. (Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010; 2020; Lebanidze 2019) The regime outcomes and 
changes in democratic quality in the former Soviet states after the end of the Cold War were 
studied merely from the democratisation perspective. (Carothers 2002: 9- 10) Thus, democratic 
transition in these states was taken for granted, and the regime outcomes were analysed against 
a large number of inconsistent categories, such as transitional, flawed, façade, managed, 
electoral, defect democracies, etc. (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Ottaway 2003; Levitsky and 
Way 2010; Vanderhill 2013; Schedler 2002) These definitions, however, fail at explaining 
diverse regime trajectories in these states. (Levitsky Way 2010: 3) The reason is that there is a 
lack of empirical foundation for the scholarship, which assumes that in the post-Cold war 
period, all these hybrid regimes started to pursue the path of democratisation. The 
democratisation theory ‘has been an insufficient guide’ with regard to explaining regime 
trajectories since its primary focus has been ‘successes rather than failures’. (Lynch 2004: 341-
342) Thus, considering the relative characteristics of the degree of democracy, the outcome of 
the political transformation does not have to be necessarily democratic. (Lebanidze 2019: 29) 
Instead, these regimes usually neither democratise nor become authoritarian and therefore fall 
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in ‘the grey zone’, which, according to Thomas Carothers (2002: 9), is a regime category 
between the aforesaid two. These hybrid regimes are referred to as competitive authoritarian by 
Levitsky and Way (2010) 
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Table 1. Regime types. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 13) 
 
As table 1 demonstrates, competitive authoritarian regimes are based on democratic institutions, 
albeit their major peculiarity is the abuse of power by ruling elites for obtaining considerable 
advantage over their opponents. The regimes are referred to as ‘competitive’ since political 
opponents are still able to compete. Nevertheless, the contest field is significantly tilted towards 
the incumbents. Therefore, political competition remains unfair.  (Levitsky and Way 2010: 3-
5; Levitsky and Way 2006: 380) Of note, competitive authoritarian elites utilise external 
incentives for their political preferences and survival strategies. They ‘push their political 
agenda’, please their electorates and consolidate their control. (Ademmer and Börzel 2013: 586)  
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The concept of competitive authoritarianism is the centrepiece in studying changes in 
democratic quality and regime trajectories. Being in ‘grey zone’, on the threshold between 
authoritarianism and democracy, the competitive authoritarian regimes show a great deal of 
susceptibility to external democracy reinforcing and autocracy promoting influences. (Levitsky 
and Way 2010: 4) Due to these pressures, competitive authoritarian regimes do not democratise, 
become authoritarian or in some cases continue to remain hybrid regimes with varying degrees 
of democratic quality. Some competitive authoritarian regimes democratise or become fully 
authoritarian. (Erdmann 2011: 8- 9; Levitsky and Way 2010: 4, 41)  
One of the major factors why competitive authoritarian regimes do not transform into 
democracies is due to external influence from non-democratic regional actors – the black 
knights. The black knights promote authoritarianism through direct and/or indirect strategies 
and interfere in democratisation processes. (Vanderhill 2013: 23- 24) Under these external 
influences, hybrid regimes with a mixture of democratic and authoritarian features tilt more 
towards democracy or authoritarianism across time. (Lebanidze 2019: 29) 
                                  
Figure 1. External democratic and authoritarian influences on competitive authoritarian 
regimes. Author’s elaboration 
  
Between 2013 and 2019, Georgia has been continuously classified as a hybrid regime, showing 
both democratic and authoritarian characteristics, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019) as well as ‘partly free’ according to Freedom 










be considered as a competitive authoritarian regime. The democracy degree in Georgia during 
the period between 2013 and 2019 is depicted in figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2. The democracy index in Georgia (2013-2019). Author’s elaboration (based on the 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2013-2019) 
 
3.2 Promotion of authoritarianism and the black knights  
The concepts of democracy and autocracy promotion are central when it comes to 
understanding changes in democratic quality in hybrid regimes. Schweickert et al. (2012), 
Nelaeva and Semenov (2016), Pavlićević (2019), Lebanidze (2019), Ambrosio (2012) and other 
authors consider that external authoritarian and democratising influences are the major 
determinants of changes in democratic quality in hybrid (competitive authoritarian) regimes. 
The transitologist scholars started to look at promotion of authoritarianism after the crisis of 
democracy (Ercan and Gagnon 2014: 1) and rise of authoritarian regimes, such as China, 
Russia, Venezuela, which have been cooperating with the aim of thwarting democracy. 
(Plattner 2015: 8- 9; Ambrosio 2010: 381) The global balance between democracy and 
autocracy was weakened due to the failure of democratisation of the Middle Eastern states, the 
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and Schlumberger 2010: 10) Thus, democracy was not the ‘only game in town’ anymore. 
(Zielonka 2001: 514; Pu 2012: 364) Hence, it is widely argued that the 21st century marks 
failures of democracy promotion and success of autocracy diffusion with the emergence of non-
democratic states promoting their political and cultural norms. (Chou et al, 2016: 5)  
According to the Freedom House reports (2008-2019), since 2008, democracy has witnessed a 
gradual decrease globally. This demonstrates that authoritarian promotion is real, and due to 
emerging autocratic regional actors, incumbents have found ways to avoid Western criticism 
and democratising pressure. (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 7) Relatively stronger normative 
understandings start shaping third state incumbents’ decisions, complying with novel globally 
legitimated authoritarian practices. (Lee and Strang 2006: 886)  
The recent literature started to look at non-democratic external actors – the black knights – 
which counter the Western democracy reinforcement efforts and promote autocracy by using 
soft and hard power instruments. (Melnykovska et al, 2012: 77- 78; Börzel 2015: 3; Ambrosio 
2009: 13- 20) The concept of the black knights is essential with regard to studying the 
promotion of authoritarianism. Hufbauer et al. (1990: 20) introduced the concept to describe 
‘counter-hegemonic powers’, which aim at weakening the ‘democratising pressure’ from the 
EU and US in targeted states through economic, military and diplomatic support. Levitsky and 
Way (2010: 41) define the black knights as states aiming at halting democratisation by 
supporting authoritarian regimes’ stability through economic, military and/or diplomatic 
means. The black knights are ‘rising’ authoritarian actors, such as Russia and China, where 
autocratic regimes survived, after which these actors started to promote their non-democratic 
models abroad with the purpose of countering and circumventing democratic spill-overs from 
the West. (Bader 2015: 24- 25; Levitsky and Way 2010: 41)  
The transitologist literature categorises China, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and 
sometimes even France as the black knights since these states have been utilising the aforesaid 
methods to support authoritarian regimes’ stability in various states. (Ambrosio 2009; 2010; 
Obydenkova and Libman 2015; Lebanidze 2019; Levitsky and Way 2010; 2020) For instance, 
Russia supported the authoritarian regime in neighbouring Belarus, whereas France aided 
autocrat ruling elites in its former colonies in Africa, such as Cameroon and Gabon. The same 
did not occur in Eastern Europe or the Americas after the end of the Cold War since the EU, as 
well as the US, were ‘only game in town’ and the pressure on target states to democratise was 
high. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 41- 42) Thus, the EU’s ‘transformative power’ in the post-
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Soviet space was deemed the most important. (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 1) 
However, the democratising influence of the West was gradually considered ineffective. 
(Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008: 207; Lebanidze 2019: 4)  
The following thesis draws on the scholarship on the external dimension on regime changes, 
according to which, the EU is the major democracy-reinforcing power in the post-Soviet space, 
whereas China and Russia are promoters of authoritarianism, i.e. the black knights. (Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 11; Ambrosio 2010; 2012)  
 
3.3 The neo-Institutionalist approach   
The following study draws on the literature on democratisation and promotion of 
authoritarianism, which explore the causality between changes in quality of democracy and 
external authoritarian and democratising influences. The existing scholarship is largely framed 
under the neo-Institutionalist theories, which are central when it comes to studying strategies 
and instruments of promotion of democracy and authoritarianism abroad. The studies follow 
two major theories of the neo-Institutionalist school, Rational Choice Institutionalism and 
Sociological Institutionalism. The major difference between the theories is the focus on 
different strategies of regime promotion.  
According to the neo-Institutionalist approach, promotion of regimes, i.e. authoritarianism and 
democracy, follow similar strategies – ‘driving forces’. (Schweickert et al, 2012: 4) These are 
conditionality, socialisation (integration) and diffusion of norms. (Franke et al, 2010: 151- 152) 
The strategies of regime promotion differ with regard to their nature and therefore follow 
different logics. (Börzel and Risse 2000: 2) Regimes can be disseminated unintendedly through 
values and norms as well as through deliberate, active policies, such as, on the one hand, 
conditionality, and on the other – socialisation (integration) – through which authoritarian 
values and norms are promoted. (Schweickert et al, 2012: 4- 5) Franke et al. (2010: 151) divide 
these strategies into two groups: tangible (conditionality and incentives) and non-tangible 






3.3.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Firstly, one of the strategies (mechanisms) of authoritarian promotion is the conditionality, i.e. 
‘sticks and carrots’ mechanism, which implies implementing active policies, such as external 
pressure or coercion aimed at shifting policy preferences of incumbents. (Lebanidze 2019: 258) 
Conditionality is based on the logic of consequentialism, meaning that external actors have 
assumptions that third state incumbents’ preferences can be shifted when provided incentives, 
such as rewards for loyalty or demands, which can be followed by sanctions or coercive 
measures, if not fulfilled. (Schweickert 2012: 3; Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 17) 
Rational Choice Instrumentalism (RCI) is central in studying external influences on domestic 
changes through conditionality and incentives. RCI follows the logic of consequentialism and 
sees actors as ‘rational, goal-oriented and purposeful’. (Lebanidze 2019: 141) The actors have 
a set of preferences – goals – and in order to achieve them, they act instrumentally with a cost-
benefitting manner. (Börzel and Risse 2000: 6) Thus, institutions or in other words, the 
exogenous ‘game form’ – conditionality and incentives (Shepsle 2006: 24) – influence third 
state domestic elites’ set of choices to democratise or remain authoritarian. (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 12) While external actors employ these instruments to influence target states 
domestically, the latter follow rational calculations regarding the reactions they will encounter 
domestically as well as externally in the case of democratisation or becoming authoritarian. 
(Tolstrup 2013: 726- 727) Thus, the international system, consisting of different actors and their 
strategies, i.e. conditionality, determines changes of third states’ democratic quality and regime 
trajectories. (Bulmer 2008: 56)  
 
3.3.2. Sociological Institutionalism  
Apart from the logic of consequentialism, autocracy promotion strategies follow the logic of 
appropriateness, which refers to diffusion of norms, values, and ideas. (Kopstein and Reilly 
2000; Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 17) This type of autocracy promotion was referred to as 
autocracy diffusion by Ambrosio (2010). In contrast to RCI, SI concentrates on autocracy 
diffusion, which unlike external pressure on third states through conditionality, takes place 
mainly via linkages (contacts) between external actors and target states. (Schweickert et al, 
2012: 4- 6) SI follows the logic of appropriateness and claims that actors are guided by norms 
and values, and external democracy or authoritarian promotion shifts their domestic ‘value-
driven’ policy preferences and strategies. (Börzel and Risse 2000: 2; Lebanidze 2019: 32) 
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Affected by external autocracy diffusion, third state incumbents start making decisions based 
on external actors’ choices. (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 7) Thus, autocracy diffusion sets 
international standards, which lead to the condition where appropriateness (balance) between 
authoritarianism and democracy becomes tilted towards the former. (Ambrosio 2010: 380)  
SI argues that diffusion of authoritarianism takes place in two different ways. Firstly, it can be 
a ‘learning process’, through which incumbents look for solutions to their problems 
internationally. (Weyland 2005: 271) Third state governments seek to boost their power 
domestically following their role models abroad. (Ambrosio 2010: 381; Elkins and Simmons 
2005: 10) A good example of that is the Japanese ruling elites, who have reformed the state’s 
ruling system in compliance with ‘successful Western prototypes’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 
151), or the Colour Revolutions in the post-Soviet space. (Ambrosio 2012: 383)  
Secondly, autocracy diffusion can be undertaken through the socialisation or sometimes 
referred to as integration strategies of external actors. These strategies also follow the logic of 
appropriateness and imply various types of integration between two actors. The concept of 
socialisation has been borrowed by political scientists from sociology to refer to the diffusion 
of norms and values through integration. (Schweickert et al, 2012: 3- 4) Socialisation is similar 
to unintended diffusion of norms, albeit it implies a target state’s economic and political 
dependence on an external actor. (Wendt 1999: 82; Pu 2012: 345- 346) Promotion of 
authoritarianism, in this case, is ‘intended’ and more active. (Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 
17) Thus, external regional actors purposefully disseminate political values and norms and try 
to create close economic, political and cultural linkages, which work as transmitting channels 
of authoritarian values to target states. (Ambrosio 2010: 371; Pu 2012) Obydenkova and 
Libman (2015: 17) refer to the integration strategies of regime promotion as a ‘conscious effort’ 
of supporting regimes beyond borders.  
It is worthwhile to note that the discrepancy between conditionality and socialisation can be 
small since both strategies are carried out by active engagement or as Franke et al. (2010: 151) 
call it ‘tangible’ strategies of external actors. Nonetheless, the former refers to imposing 
pressure, i.e. conditionality, on third states, while the latter implies the active establishment of 






3.3.3 Application of the Sociological and Rationalist Institutionalist framework  
The theories of Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism are applied to the following 
research. SI frames the assessment of China’s and the EU’s impact on the quality of democracy 
in Georgia. China does not utilise hard power or conditionality, unlike Russia and employs 
strategies of political support and economic cooperation. (Ambrosio 2010: 376) China 
promotes authoritarianism through its soft power as well. (Ambrosio 2009; Ambrosio 2010) 
China’s strategies of autocracy promotion follow the logic of appropriateness and therefore are 
framed under SI, which, instead of concentrating on explaining conditionality, focuses on 
socialisation (integration) strategies and diffusion of norms. (Börzel and Risse 2000: 2) Based 
on SI, it can be claimed that China’s closer integration with Georgia and soft power can change 
values of the Georgian ruling elites and lead to a lower degree of democracy. As for the EU, its 
main strategies of democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space are political dialogue and soft 
power. (Lebanidze 2019; Börzel 2010; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) 
The RCI theory will be applied to the study since strategies of Russia include conditionality. 
Russia has been employing coercive ‘sticks’ towards Georgia. (Lebanidze 2019: 141) Thus, 
RCI, which concentrates on conditionality, will also frame the analysis of external influences 
on the democratic quality in Georgia.   
Georgia, according to the literature on regime changes, is considered as a third state in target 
and, similarly to other post-Soviet states, is influenced by external actors promoting regimes. 
(Levitsky and Way 2010; Lebanidze 2019) Georgia, along with other post-Soviet states, is 
located between democratic and authoritarian actors, which are in normative and ideological 
competition. (Lebanidze 2019: 32) These actors can shape and/or change target state 
incumbents’ choices and values through different strategies, which were discussed above. 
(Nilsson 2018: 16- 17) SI explains how external influences, i.e. socialisation and soft power, 
affect and change the values of the Georgian incumbents. RCI, on the other hand, focuses on 
the state’s foreign policy strategies and how external influences, i.e. conditionality, impact the 
incumbents’ rational and ‘cost-benefit calculations’ regarding democratisation or becoming 
authoritarian. (Lebanidze 2019: 31- 32) 
Furthermore, Georgia is vulnerable to external influences since it is one of the ‘weak states with 
small, aid-dependent economies’ that ‘are more vulnerable to external pressure than those of 
larger countries with substantial military and/or economic power (e.g., China and Russia).’ 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 41) Apart from that, Georgia is a competitive (hybrid) authoritarian 
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regime and hence, as it was discussed previously, is highly susceptible to external actors’ 
democracy or authoritarian reinforcing influences. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 4- 5, 39)  
In the literature on regime changes, China is considered as an autocracy promoter abroad, which 
shapes domestic elites’ political behaviour. Hence, it can be assumed that China’s engagement 
and instrumentalisation of its strategies of autocracy promotion can lead to the stabilisation of 
competitive authoritarian regimes and insulate the democracy reinforcing impact from the 
West. (Ambrosio 2009) Thus, Chinese influence can increase the cost of democratisation for 
incumbent parties, which leads to the regime stabilisation and decline in the quality of 
democracy. (Ambrosio 2012)  
Apart from analysing external autocracy promoting strategies, which are determinants of 
changes in democratic quality (Lebanidze 2019: 31), it is also essential that the policy directions 
and values of domestic elites are not neglected. The incumbents’ normative agenda and foreign 
policy strategies largely impact the state’s compliance with external goals (Hermann 1990: 20) 
Thus, domestic factors, such as incumbents’ foreign policy strategies towards external actors 
and their normative preferences are crucial for analysing changes in democratic quality. (Sasse 
2012: 553) The ruling elites’ strategies are ‘gatekeepers’ and have an influence on a state’s 
linkages with actors since they ‘actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors’. (Tolstrup 
2013: 718) The neo-Institutionalist approach, which frames the following thesis, does not ditch 
domestic factors, and considers them equally important as external factors. While SI looks at 
the incumbents’ normative preferences, RCI concentrates on their foreign strategies towards 
external actors. (Lebanidze 2019: 33- 36; Tolstrup 2013: 727) Therefore, the thesis does not 
diminish their importance. Domestic incumbent’s foreign strategies and normative preferences 
are included in the analytical model of Linkage and Leverage, which is discussed below.  
 
3.4 The analytical model of Linkage and Leverage  
The LL analytical model employed in the following study has been introduced by Levitsky and 
Way (2006). Since then, only a limited number of scholars have applied this model to their 
research. The most prominent work of Levitsky and Way (2010) – ‘Competitive 
Authoritarianism, Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War’ is based on the LL analytical model and 
explains the post-Cold War regime outcomes in some 35 states. The authors analyse the 
difference between the regime trajectories in a variety of competitive authoritarian states by 
exploring their ties (linkage) and leverages to the West. The authors (2010: 5) assume that there 
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is a lack of understanding of the international environment and regime changes and the theories 
cannot alone explain the discrepancies with regard to regime changes between various countries 
and regions in the post-Cold War period. Hence, Levitsky and Way (2010: 38) identify a variety 
of strategies of international influence and integrate all of them in a single theoretical 
framework of Linkage and Leverage.  
Levitsky and Way (2010: 41- 44) argue that the success of democracy promotion by the West 
in third states hinges on two factors – linkages and leverage. Under linkage, Levitsky and Way 
(2010: 43) imply ‘the density of ties and cross-border flows among particular countries and the 
United States, the EU and Western-dominated multilateral institutions’. Linkages (ties) 
between two actors are economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, social, information, civil 
society. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 43- 44) As for leverage, it is referred to  ‘(1) regimes’ 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the West and/or their ability to avoid Western action aimed at 
punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalisation; and (2) the potential impact (in terms 
of economic health or security) of Western punitive action toward target states.’ (Levitsky and 
Way 2010: 41) In other words, Levitsky and Way (2010, 40- 41) present linkage and leverage 
to assess how third states’ incumbents are affected by ‘external democratising’ influence. 
Hence, according to this model, linkage and leverage are the main determinants of change of 
democratic quality in third states. An external actor can influence a state when the latter’s 
vulnerability (leverage) to the former is high and ties (linkages) are dense. (Levitsky and Way 
2014: 152)  
Levitsky and Way (2010: 42) make an important point, stating that target states’ leverage to the 
West alone cannot lead to their democratisation. If leverage were a decisive factor, the 
democratisation would be spread equally in different countries with hybrid regimes across the 
globe. In this case, for instance, Zimbabwe and Slovakia would undergo similar 
democratisation effects. (Tolstrup 2013: 719) By contrast, differences in degrees of linkages 
are key to explaining why the Western democracy reinforcing efforts have been successful in 
some states, whereas it has failed in others. (Tolstrup 2013: 719- 720) Levitsky and Way (2010: 
43) acknowledge that linkage is ‘central to understanding variation in the effectiveness of 
international democratising pressure’. 
Levitsky and Way (2010) explain that competitive authoritarian states (hybrid regimes) which 
showed high linkages (ties) and leverage to the West in the 1990s democratised and those which 
had low progressed towards authoritarianism. For instance, Belarus did not democratise after 
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the Cold War since it had low contacts (linkages) with the West and transformed into autocracy. 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 201) On the contrary, Slovakia, which had dense linkages with the 
West, became democratic. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 91)  
The framework of LL has been employed by other studies as an analytical model to assess 
external actors democratising or autocracy promotion influences. One of the prominent 
examples is Lebanidze’s (2019) ‘Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure’. The LL 
model in this seminal book is shaped under the neo-Institutionalist framework. Another 
example is ‘Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative’ (Xing 2019), which examines 
Chinese influence in various regions, such as Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Central Europe, and 
the Middle East from several theoretical perspectives.  
As it was mentioned above, the LL analytical model merely explains to what extent the West 
influences the quality of democracy in target states. (Levitsky and Way 2010) Despite that, in 
the following study, the model is employed to measure influences from the actors promoting 
authoritarianism as well since the major objective of the thesis is to analyse China’s impact on 
the quality of democracy in Georgia. Due to that, the model is modified in accordance with the 
study aims. In addition, complying with the literature on democracy and autocracy promotion 
in the post-Soviet space, the leverage of the EU and Russia is analysed and compared to that of 
China. This helps the study to avoid simply showing the correlation and to argue whether the 
variation in the degree of democracy is in a causal relationship with the Chinese influence.  
It is noteworthy to mention that the model does not assess the leverage of the US to Georgia. 
First of all, the EU is the most important external actor in terms of promoting democracy in the 
post-Soviet region, including Georgia. The democratisation strategies of the West has been led 
by the EU initiatives, such as EaP, AA, etc., whereas the US democratising impact in the region 
has been varying depending on the governing administration. In this regard, the EU’s 
engagement has been stable. (Lebanidze 2019: 134) Moreover, while the EU has been the 
biggest trade partner for Georgia, the US-Georgia economic ties have been relatively weak. 
(geostat.ge) Due to these reasons, it is more rational to look at the EU leverage in comparison 






3.4.1 Limitations and alteration of the Linkage and Leverage model  
There are several issues to note concerning the Linkage and Leverage model, which makes it 
challenging to employ the genuine model designed by Levitsky and Way (2010) in the 
following study. To start with, the most significant limitation pertains to the lack of information 
on how degrees of linkage are assessed. Levitsky and Way (2010: 43- 44) introduce a number 
of categories of linkages (economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, social, information, civil 
society) to analyse to what extent states in target are dependent on external actors. Evaluation 
categories of linkages, however, are not provided. Moreover, Levitsky and Way (2010) do not 
evaluate two categories, information and civil society linkages in the study at all.  
Secondly, Levitsky and Way (2010) do not assess the domestic factors, such as the ruling 
incumbents’ foreign policy strategies towards external actors. They (2010: 72- 73) argue that 
linkages are not amenable to ruling elites. Instead, they are ‘fixed’, ‘slow-moving’ and mainly 
depend on geographic proximity and historical factors, which induce ‘interdependence among 
states’ and establish an ‘opportunity for interaction’. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 44)  
The thesis follows the Institutionalist approach and does not diminish the importance of 
domestic factors. The neo-Institutionalist theory, as it was discussed in the previous section, 
puts a significant emphasis on domestic ruling elites’ foreign policy preferences and normative 
agenda. (Börzel and Risse 2000: 12) This limitation is highlighted by Tolstrup (2013: 178) as 
well, who claims that ‘the structural determinants (linkages) that constitute the basis of their 
[Levitsky and Way] explanation are not non-amenable as they claim, but can be influenced to 
a great extent by what I term the gatekeeper elites of the target country’ and that external factors 
‘should not only be perceived as mere objects of external influence.’ (Tolstrup 2013: 721)  
Thirdly, the difference between the concepts of linkage and leverage could seem vague at times 
since they overlap. For instance, the trade ties are attributed to linkage by Levitsky and Way 
(2010: 153), however, a high share of economic ties increases a state’s leverage (vulnerability) 
to an external actor as well. In other words, linkage and leverage both refer to vulnerability to 
external actors – leverage. Levitsky and Way (2014: 50, 153) also note that a high degree of 
leverage and linkage usually overlap since a high degree of leverage (vulnerability) combined 
with dense linkage (ties) lead to higher vulnerability, i.e. leverage, to the Western pressure. For 
instance, when linkage to the West increases, the cost of non-democratic behaviour – a state’s 
leverage (vulnerability) to the West – rises. Levitsky and Way (2010: 153) state, ‘because 
linkage raises the cost of international norm-violating behaviour for individual actors (e.g., lost 
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business, professional, or funding opportunities), it also may be viewed as a form of leverage.’ 
Due to these reasons, it seems that linkage co-determines target states’ vulnerability to an 
external actor, and thus it can be considered the same as leverage (vulnerability). Hence, in 
order to avoid confusion, it is highly rational to combine leverage and linkage into a single 
concept – leverage. It is relevant since both concepts imply external regional actors’ impact on 
target states. This is also argued by Obydenkova and Libman (2015: 17) and Lebanidze (2019: 
41), who deem both concepts similar. The following study aims to analyse the degree of 
influence external actors have on the degree of democracy in Georgia, and therefore, it is 
relevant to combine the concepts of linkage and leverage and evaluate them together. Assessing 
these factors separately will not bring any added value for the thesis.  
Another limitation, which has been briefly touched upon previously is that Levitsky and Way 
(2010) measure linkage and leverage merely between target competitive authoritarian states 
and external actors promoting democracy, i.e. the EU and the US. Thus, they somehow 
disregard analysing linkages and leverages between target states and autocracy reinforcing 
actors – the black knights. Instead, assessing the influence of the black knights, Levitsky and 
Way (2010: 373) simply downgrade the level of Western leverage in target countries, for 
instance, from high to medium, without evaluating the strength of authoritarian actors’ 
leverages. Hughes and Sasse (2016: 314) point out that the LL framework has limitations since 
it focuses for the most part on the Western influence ‘without taking into account other relevant 
international actors’. Other authors, such as Obydenkova and Libman (2015: 19) also claim that 
the focus of the current literature on the external dimension of institutional transition is 
democracy promotion and that it is necessary to compare these dimensions in order to 
‘investigate a broader picture, accounting for the role of non-democratic actors’. Similarly, 
Pavlićević (2019), Gel’man and Lankina (2008: 58), Ambrosio (2010: 5) and Cumpanasu 
(2019: 187) also argue that to have influence and ‘exercise leverage’ on third states, autocracy 
promoting actors’ leverage to the CEE has to outscore the EU leverage. Thus, if the Western 
influence is greater than that of autocracy promoting power in third states, the trajectory of 
democracy quality will show an upward trend. Due to this limitation, the modification of the 
model is necessary so that it can be applicable to assess states’ vulnerability to the authoritarian 
external actors as well.  
Pavlićević (2019) and Lebanidze (2019) have successfully modified the LL model and 
measured Chinese and Russian influences on the democratic quality of the CEE states and post-
Soviet states, respectively. The following study will employ Lebanidze’s (2019) altered LL 
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model since it is more elaborate and precise as opposed to that of Pavlićević (2019), who does 
not present clear-cut categories for measuring degrees of leverage.  
Another important issue to note is that while the seminal book of Lebanidze (2019) combines 
the concepts of linkage and leverage into one – leverage, the altered model puts more emphasis 
on linkage categories, such as economic and political. Measuring leverages of different external 
actors (EU, Chinese, Russian) to a single country – Georgia, will not illustrate any difference 
since it will be constant to all the actors. This is because leverage implies the size and strength 
of third countries and their bargaining power, which depends on, for instance, oil production or 
high GDP. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 41, 372- 373) These factors may not be constant 
throughout time, albeit they show persistence vis-a-vis to all external actors. (Tolstrup 2013: 
719- 720)  
Furthermore, Lebanidze (2019) frames the LL model under the neo-Institutionalism – SI and 
RCI theories – with the leverage categories to analyse both conditionality and diffusion 
strategies of both autocracy and democracy promoting actors, i.e. Russia and the EU. Therefore, 
the application of Lebanidze’s altered model of LL to the following study is relevant, since the 
latter looks at both types of actors, the black knights, i.e. China and Russia, and democracy 
reinforcing actor – the EU. Chinese strategies of autocracy promotion encompass economic and 
political socialization and soft power. (Schweickert et al, 2012: 4- 5) The strength of these 
strategies can be evaluated by analysing economic, political, and normative leverages, all of 
which are presented in Lebanidze’s (2019) modified model. (See Figure 3) 
Strategies are crucial for studying external influences on the quality of democracy in 
competitive authoritarian target states. As it was discussed above, external actors that promote 
democracy or authoritarianism follow strategies based on their goals and values. (Börzel 2015: 
5) Schweickert et al. (2012: 4) refer to strategies as frameworks through which regional actors 
promote authoritarianism through multilateral or bilateral relations. Leverages work as spill-
over channels of regional actors’ strategies (Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 16, 32) to ‘bind 
states together’ and/or transfer their norms and change or boost regimes in third states. 
(Ambrosio 2011: 11) Vachudova (2005: 341) identifies ‘active’ and ‘passive’ leverages. 
According to her, strategies are ‘passive’ leverages, which are instrumentalized through ‘active’ 
leverages. Leverages for Ambrosio (2011: 11) are ‘the series of relationships - including trade, 
alliances, culture, etc. - which bind states together’. The extent of China’s strategies’ 
effectiveness can be analysed through leverages, which work as spillover channels 
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(Obydenkova and Libman 2016: 1- 2) or as Levitsky and Way (2010: 44) call it, ‘transmitters’ 
of regional actors’ efforts to change or boost regimes in third states. Figure 3 below 
demonstrates China’s strategies of autocracy promotion and leverages through which the 
strength of these strategies can be assessed.  
 
 
Figure 3. China’s strategies of autocracy promotion and their instrumentalisation through 
leverages. Author’s elaboration 
 
3.5 Summary 
The following study aims to analyse how China affects the democratic quality in Georgia. The 
thesis draws on the literature on regime changes, which deems external democratising and 
authoritarian influences as determining factors in explaining changes in democratic quality. The 
regime changes became a focus of the scholarship after the end of the Cold War when the West 
(the EU and US) started to promote democracy. However, some states, such as Russia, China, 
Saudi Arabia, etc. successfully circumvented Western democratising pressures. (Levitsky and 
Way 2010) For instance, the Tiananmen Square protests did not succeed, and China remained 
autocratic. (Time 1990) In order to avoid possible democratic spill-overs in the future, these 
authoritarian actors started to rival Western democratising powers through promoting non-
democratic values – authoritarianism – abroad, i.e.  in their neighbourhood as well as on the 
global scale. (Schweickert et al, 2012) 
External factors are significant determinants, particularly for explaining changes of regimes and 
democratic quality in hybrid regimes – competitive authoritarian states – with small GDP and 














democracy reinforcing and authoritarian influences. (Levitsky and Way 2010; Lebanidze 2019) 
Georgia in the literature on regime changes in post-Soviet space as well as in the following 
study is presented as a competitive authoritarian regime, considering that it has been a hybrid 
regime since its independence as well as during the entire period between 2013 and 2019. (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019) 
China in the abundant literature on autocracy promotion is considered as an external actor 
promoting authoritarianism, i.e. the black knight, in the Eurasian region. The black knights, 
which promote autocracy, similarly to democracy reinforcing powers, follow strategies based 
on their foreign policy goals and values. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 41; Melnykovska et al, 2012: 
77- 78; Ambrosio 2009: 13- 20) In the case of China, these strategies, as identified in the 
scholarship, are socialization (integration) and diffusion of autocratic norms (soft power). 
(Schweickert et al, 2012; Ambrosio 2010)  
The studies on strategies of democracy and autocracy promotion are, for the most part, framed 
under neo-Institutionalist theories. One of the strands of the new Institutionalist school is 
Sociological Institutionalism, which addresses socialisation strategies of regime promotion and 
diffusion of values. According to the SI, institutions, that is, external norms and values 
promoted by external actors, influence values and policies of target states. Rational Choice 
Institutionalism, on the other hand, focuses on external democratising or authoritarian pressure 
on third states, i.e. conditionality. (Schweickert et al, 2012; Lebanidze 2019; Börzel and Risse 
2000; Ambrosio 2012) Thus, located between contesting powers promoting authoritarianism 
and democracy, third state incumbents’, especially in the post-Soviet space, either democratize 
or become authoritarian, depending on the strength of external influences and the incumbents’ 
values as well as their foreign policy strategies. The balance between these factors determines 
whether the regime tilts towards democracy or authoritarianism. (Bader 2015; Lebanidze 2019; 
Pavlićević 2019) 
The neo-Institutionalist school considers external actors’ leverage to target states as the main 
tool of impact on domestic regimes. (Levitsky and Way 2010; Lebanidze 2019) Thus, the 
following study assesses the degree of leverage of China to Georgia to analyse the former’s 
influence on the democratic quality in the latter. Leverage degrees are evaluated under the 
framework of Linkage and Leverage, initially designed by Levitsky and Way (2010). The 
model, however, is imported from Lebanidze’s works (2019; Lebanidze and Grigalashvili 
2018) due to several limitations. Firstly, Levitsky and Way (2010) do not present the 
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measurement categories for evaluating degrees of linkage and leverage, which is solved in the 
seminal book of Lebanidze (2019). Secondly, the concepts of linkage and leverage will be 
combined since the difference between linkage and leverage is vague, and both of them evaluate 
target states’ vulnerability (dependence) to external actors. Thirdly, Levitsky and Way (2010) 
do not analyse the authoritarian external influence in the model as opposed to Lebanidze’s 
(2019) who looks at both democratising as well as autocracy promoting actors. Moreover, 
Lebanidze’s (2019) altered LL model is framed under the Rationalist and Sociological 
Institutionalism, combining leverages necessary for analysing different strategies, i.e. 
conditionality, socialization, soft power, which are employed by China, Russia and the EU. 
Assessing the leverage degrees, according to Lebanidze’s model, will show how China’s 
strategies of autocracy promotion have affected the degree of democracy in Georgia during the 

















Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology  
The following chapter introduces the research design and methodology. The research follows a 
factor-centric single case design. The first section of the chapter presents the case selection and 
timeframe. The second section introduces the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the 
dependent variable – degree of democracy. Following that, the third section introduces the 
independent variable of the study – China’s leverage to Georgia and presents the analytical 
framework, which is employed in the thesis for evaluating China’s influence on the democratic 
quality in Georgia. The last part of the chapter presents data collection methods which are 
applied in the research.   
 
4.1 Case selection and timeframe 
The main aim of the study is to analyse China’s promotion of authoritarianism in Georgia, and 
thus the research question is: 
Q: How does China affect the degree of democracy in Georgia? 
The research follows a single case study design and analyses the causality between the Chinese 
external influence and the shifts of the democratic quality in Georgia during the 2013-2019 
period. The case study is a research strategy, which focuses on a contemporary phenomenon 
and questions: ‘how’ and ‘why’. (Yin 2003: 1) The research thus looks at ‘operational links 
needing to be traced over time’. (Yin 2003: 6) In other words, case study observes ‘causal 
processes’ between two or more variables. (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007: 10) Hence, 
the case study design is employed to ‘cover contextual conditions’ that can be applicable to a 
phenomenon in question. (Yin 2003, cited in Baxter and Jack 2010: 545) A single case study is 
a type of case study design when ‘the researcher only wants to study one single thing’. (Yin 
2003, cited in Gustafsson 2017) The case study design is often applied to researches in the fields 
of politics, sociology, and other social sciences. (Yin 2003: 1) 
The following case study is factor-oriented since it explains whether and how China affects the 
quality of democracy in Georgia. The factor-centric case study aims at analysing the impact of 
a particular effect, i.e. an independent variable (X), on a certain phenomenon – a dependent 
variable (Y). Thus, a typical question of the factor-oriented case study would be: ‘does X1 cause 
Y or what effect does a X1 have on Y and how much?’. (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007: 
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7- 8) In the following case study, an independent variable (X) is China’s leverage to Georgia, 
and a dependent variable (Y) is the degree of democracy in Georgia.  
The case selection is based on several factors. Firstly, China’s economic rise started in 2013, 
after the Chinese Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping announced the One Belt One Road 
(OBOR4) Initiative (currently known as the BRI) ‘to shorten the distance between China and 
Europe’. (Larsen 2017b) A drastic change in the Chinese foreign policy turned Eastern Europe 
and the South Caucasus, including Georgia, into a strategic location for Beijing to pursue its 
goals. Thus, the Sino-Georgian relations, which started in 1992, have intensified since 2013. 
(Charaia et al, 2020) In 2013, China and Georgia signed the Agreement on Technical and 
Financial Cooperation to enhance ‘friendly relations between the two countries’. (Legislative 
Herald of Georgia 2013)  
Moreover, in 2018, Georgia became the first country in the post-Soviet region to conclude the 
FTA with China. (Eder 2018: 16- 17) Georgia, on the other hand, became the 11th state to have 
the agreement in play with Beijing. (Charaia et al, 2020: 4) Furthermore, the first-ever direct 
railway route, as well as a flight connection between China and Georgia, have been introduced 
during the same period as well. Nowadays, there are approximately 30 Chinese companies 
cooperating with Georgia in the spheres of infrastructure, energy, finances, agriculture, free 
industrial zones, logistics, telecommunications, etc. Apart from that, the Silk Road Forum has 
been held in Georgia once in every two years since 2015. In 2019, the forum hosted more than 
2000 delegates from approximately 60 countries. (Charaia et al, 2020: 5, 32) 
Even though the Sino-Georgian relations have seen an upward trend in the six-year period under 
study, the effect of these relations on Georgia’s democratic quality is rather understudied. (See 
Chapter 2) Thus, it is highly relevant to analyse and assess how China influences the degree of 
democracy in Georgia. In the framework of neo-Institutionalism, China promotes 
authoritarianism abroad and thus affects regimes. (Bulmer 2008: 56) Hence, it is interesting to 
explore the causality between Chinese influence and the degree of democracy in Georgia.  
Due to the considerable growth of the Chinese interests towards Georgia and intensification of 
the relations between the actors, the study timeframe will be between 2013 and now. In addition, 
throughout these six years, the country remained a hybrid regime (competitive authoritarian), 
 
4 Since 2016, One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) is referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 
OBOR implied solely a single road, whereas BRI better reflects multiple routes of the initiatives. (Stanzel 2017) 
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and since 2013 the Democracy Index (quality of democracy) saw a significant decrease, from 
5.95 to 5.42, the lowest figure in the entire period. (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2013; 
2014; 2019) Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that the year 2020 has not ended yet, and the 
annual data necessary for the analysis is not available. Therefore, the timeframe of the data is 
limited between 2013 and 2019 years instead of the years 2013 and 2020. 
 
4.2 The degree of democracy 
The degree of democracy is a dependent variable in the thesis. Democracy is rather a relative 
concept since democratic features to different extents are peculiar to democratic, hybrid as well 
as authoritarian regimes. Despite the fact that hybrid (competitive authoritarian) regimes are 
neither democracies nor authoritarian, it is still possible to measure the degree of democracy in 
these regimes against specific attributes. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 5) It is noteworthy to point 
out that there is no single definition of democracy and framework for its measurement and is 
largely debated in academia. There are abundant definitions of the concept, according to the 
scholars’ preferences. (Bühlmann et al, 2007: 3- 4) As Horowitz (2006: 1) states in his essay, 
‘the world’s only superpower is rhetorically and militarily promoting a political system that 
remains undefined – and it is staking its credibility and treasure on that pursuit.’ 
There are three major strands in the literature on democracy: minimalist, moderate and 
maximalist. (Lebanidze 2019: 58) According to the maximalist approach, democratic 
characteristics are the welfare state and social justice. (Bühlmann et al, 2007: 4) This approach 
encompasses features of representative and participatory democracies and focuses on the level 
of social inequalities. In this case, merely political and civil rights are not seen as sufficient for 
becoming a democracy. The necessary prerequisite is the allocation of economic resources 
equally by the government. Thus, social democracy is the model for the maximalist 
understanding of democracy. (Bühlmann et al, 2007: 5) 
The minimalist conceptualisation of democracy, on the contrary, pertains to the Schumpeterian 
elitist type of democracy and focuses on competitive elections. (Bühlmann et al, 2007: 4; 
Lebanidze 2019: 58; Levitsky and Way 2010: 6) The minimalist democracy implies the 
protection of citizens, who make decisions by whom they will be governed for a particular 
period of time. Hence, the minimalist type of democracy is usually referred to as ‘government 
of the people’. (Bühlmann et al, 2007: 4)  
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The moderate conceptualisation falls between the maximalist and minimalist approaches of 
Schumpeter and Heller, respectively, and represents the neo-Institutionalist approach to 
understanding the concept of democracy. The moderate democracy does not encompass 
maximalist characteristics of the concept, such as an equal share of resources, which are not 
features of democracy per se but merely the potential results of democratic policies. (Bühlmann 
et al, 2007: 15- 16) The moderate democracy encompasses the following partial regimes: ‘a 
democratic electoral regime (A), political rights of participation (B), civil rights (C), horizontal 
accountability (D), and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of the 
democratically elected representatives (E)’. (Bühlmann et al, 2007: 20 Partial regimes are 
effective provided that they are embedded, meaning that they are interdependent. Thus, 
democracy is a system of intertwined partial regimes, which support each other’s functioning. 
Apart from internal embeddedness, democratic regimes are interdependent externally in an 
international ‘environment that surrounds, enables and stabilizes the democratic regime’. 
(Bühlmann et al, 2007: 22) 
Levitsky and Way (2010) follow the moderate approach to understanding democracy. They 
introduce five characteristics: ‘1. Free, fair, and competitive elections; 2. Full adult suffrage; 3. 
Protection of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, press and associations; 4. The absence 
of non-elected authorities which restrict elites governing power. 5. The existence of reasonable 
playing field between ruling elites and opposition’. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 5- 6) Thus, 
Levitsky and Way (2010: 6) belong to the Institutionalist understanding of the democracy 
conception. Since the following study is framed under the neo-Institutionalist theory and largely 
draws on the seminal books of Levitsky and Way (2010), it follows the moderate 
(Institutionalist) conceptualisation of democracy.  
The midrange (moderate) assessment of democracy has been developed to ‘fill in a gap in 
empirical democracy measurement’ and for designing a democracy ranking. (Bühlmann et al, 
2007: 3) According to Lebanidze (2019), there are a number of democracy indices, whose 
methodology are ‘insufficient and lack conceptual clarity’. (Lebanidze 2019: 30)  
The assessment of the degree of democracy in Georgia during the 2013-2019 period is essential 
for the following study. Nevertheless, the lack of resources makes it challenging to conduct a 
proper evaluation of the democracy degree in Georgia throughout the period in question. 
Therefore, the study imports the democracy index data provided by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, a UK-based organisation, which for more than seven decades has worked with businesses, 
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companies, academic institutions, and governments with navigating ‘the ever-changing global 
landscape’. (www.eiu.com) The Economist Intelligence Unit is a reliable source since it is 
frequently referenced in scholarly studied. The Economist Intelligence Unit follows the 
moderate understanding of democracy, and for assessing the democratic quality, it evaluates 
five categories: ‘electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 
political participation; and political culture’. (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017: 64) The 
Economist Intelligence Unit does not address social and economic equality and considers the 
categories, i.e. the partial regimes, as ‘interrelated and form a coherent conceptual whole’. ‘The 
condition of holding free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of 
political freedom, is clearly the sine qua non of all definitions.’ (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2017: 64) 
Apart from the Economist Intelligence Unit, there is Freedom House Democracy Index, which 
is highly reliable as well. However, Freedom House follows a more minimalist approach of the 
democracy conception, looking at political rights and civil liberties. (www.freedomhouse.org) 
The Freedom House criteria are similar to those of Dahl’s (1970), whose definitions of 
democracy are Schumpeterian and thus represent the minimalist approach. (Levitsky and Way 
2010: 5- 6; The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017: 64) Thus, due to the abovementioned 
reasons, the following study will import the data of Democracy Index from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit reports.  
 
4.3 The degree of leverage  
The following study aims to analyse China’s influence on Georgia’s degree of democracy. 
Merely assuming that China promotes autocracy in the country without evaluating the degree 
of influence (leverage) is not sufficient to comprehend how, i.e. by what means, an external 
actor affects the regime or democracy quality of a third state.  
As it was widely discussed in the previous chapter, autocratic norms and practices are ‘diffused 
through organizational fields or across nations’. (Hall and Taylor 2006: 14) Actors have their 
goals, according to which they employ particular strategies (instruments) to spread their norms. 
(Börzel and Risse 2000: 8- 9; Lebanidze 2019: 32; Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 11) 
Strategies are instrumentalized through leverages, which are channels of regional actors’ 
regime promotion. (Obydenkova and Libman 2015: 16, 32; Levitsky and Way 2010: 44; 
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Lebanidze 2019: 111) The study evaluates the degree of leverage (economic, political, 
normative), which shows how strong autocracy and democracy promotion strategies are. 
The degree of leverage in the study is an independent variable and refers to the degree of 
vulnerability of a target state on an external actor. The assessment of the degree of leverage is 
based on the LL model (Levitsky and Way 2010) altered by Lebanidze (2019). In order to argue 
whether China influences the quality of democracy in Georgia, it is crucial to compare China’s 
leverage to Russia’s and the EU’s leverages. The following sub-sections introduce the 
operationalization of economic, political and normative leverages. 
 
4.3.1 Economic leverage  
Economic leverage evaluates to what extent Georgia’s economy is dependent (vulnerable) on 
a regional actor (China, the EU, Russia). The economic dependence on external actors is 
assessed on the scale of low (0-1), medium (1-2), high (2-3). Three categories are employed for 
measuring economic leverage: dependence on export, import, foreign direct investment (FDI). 





Dependence on the amount of total export to the external actor 
Import  
 
Dependence on the amount of total import from the external 
actor 
Foreign direct investment 
 
Dependence on the amount of total FDI from the external actor 
                                                                                                                                                            
Table 2. Economic leverage. Author’s Elaboration. (based on Lebanidze 2019: 295- 297; 
Lebanidze and Grigalashvili 2018: 26)  
 
The economic statistical data (import, export, FDI) is assessed similarly to Lebanidze (2019). 
The degrees of economic leverage are evaluated on a scale from 0 to 3 (0-1 = low leverage; 1-
2 = medium leverage; 2-3 = high leverage). Economic data (export, import, FDI) of each 
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external actor are compared and thus assigned scores accordingly. For instance, Georgia’s 
import from the EU in 2017 amounted 2200.7 million USD and was higher than the amount of 
Georgia’s import from China and Russia, which amounted 732.6 million USD and 786.9 
million USD, respectively. Since in 2017, Georgia’s import from the EU was higher than the 
other two figures, the import category of the EU economic leverage to Georgia is assigned the 
highest score of 3 (100%). The other two figures, Georgia’s import from China and Russia, are 
compared (in percentages) to the highest figure and thus are graded from 0 to 3 proportionally. 
Table 3 below illustrates this example.  
External actors’ total economic leverage to Georgia is calculated by averaging the scores of 
each category. For instance, if the degree of import leverage of an external actor is a score of 3 
(high), export leverage a score of 2 (medium) and FDI leverage – 1 (low), the total economic 
leverage is the arithmetic mean of the three scores, that is 2 (medium). Additionally, overall 
leverage degree is assessed similarly through the calculation of the arithmetic mean of 
economic, political and normative leverage degrees (scores) as well.  
 
External actors Georgian import (2017) The degrees of leverage 
(import category) 
China 732.6 1 (33%) 
EU 2200.7 3 (100%)  
Russia 786.9 1.1 (33.5%) 
                                                                                                                                                             
Table 3. Calculation of economic leverage degrees (scores). Author’s elaboration 
 
4.3.2 Political leverage 
The political leverage category assesses a regional actor’s political dependence on an external 
actor. For example, if a country has a security-related issue and relies on a regional actor’s 
assistance for the resolution of the problem, the former’s dependence (leverage) to the latter 
will be higher. (Lebanidze 2019: 67) Similarly, when a country is a member of a regional 
political organization led by a regional actor, it has to comply with the organisation rules and 
therefore its vulnerability to the regional actor increases. (Levitsky and Way 2010: 43) Hence, 
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under political leverage, the following factors will be assessed: 1) the need of political and 
diplomatic assistance from external power; 2) membership in regional organisations dominated 
by an external actor; 3) an external actor’s civil or military presence. The assessment of political 
leverage categories is demonstrated in table 4 below. 
 
Categories Indicators 
Diplomatic assistance  Low (1) The country does not face any security/political 
challenge or threat and therefore, the government does not rely 
on or expect any political assistance from the external actor.  
Medium (2) The country faces severe security/political challenge 
or threat, but the government does not rely on or expect 
political/diplomatic assistance from the external actor. 
High (3) The country faces acute security/political challenge or 
threat and the government relies on the political/diplomatic 
support by the external actor. 
Membership in regional 
organisations 
Low (1) The country is not a member of any organization led by 
the external actor. 
Medium (2) The country is a member of one organisation led by 
the external actor. 
High (3) The country is a member of two or more organisations 
led by the external actor. 
Military/civilian presence   Low (1) The external actor does not have any friendly or 
unfriendly civilian and/or military presence in the country. 
Medium (2) The external actor has a friendly or unfriendly 
civilian and/or military presence, which is insignificant for the 
country’s security. 
High (3) The external actor has a friendly (unfriendly) civilian 
and/or military presence in the country, which is important for the 
country’s security (or which undermines the country’s security).  
                                                                                                                                                  
Table 4. Political leverage. Author’s elaboration (based on Lebanidze 2019: 293 -295; 
Lebanidze and Grigalashvili 2019: 24- 25) 
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4.3.3 Normative leverage                                                                                                                                              
Normative leverage refers to domestic factors, which reduce or increase the external influence 
or pressure. Analysing regime trajectory variation without looking at domestic incumbents’ 
foreign policy strategies and their values is difficult since they have a substantial impact on 
incumbents’ relations with a regional actor. (Tolstrup 2013: 718) These domestic factors 
influence ‘the vulnerability of incumbent regimes vis-a-vis foreign actors’. (Lebanidze 2019: 
66, 111)  
The analysis of normative leverage follows the SI and RCI framework and imports Lebanidze’s 
(2019: 292) indicators of normative leverage, incumbents’ foreign policy aspirations and their 
declared commitment to democratic values, the rule of law and civil rights. (Lebanidze 2019: 




Foreign policy strategies 
and ideological affinity   
The EU: 
Low (1) No aspiration for the membership in the EU; no formal 
commitment towards democratic values.  
Medium (2) Aspiration for the membership in the EU; no formal 
commitment to democratic values.    
High (3) Aspiration for the membership in the EU; declared 
commitment towards democratic values. 
 
Russia (1) and China (2): 
Low (1) No aspiration for the membership in 1) CIS, CSTO, EEU, 2) 
SCO; declared commitment towards democratic values.  
Medium (2) Aspiration for the membership in 1) CIS, CSTO, EEU, 
2) SCO; declared commitment towards democratic values.  
High (3) Aspiration for the membership in 1) CIS, CSTO, EEU, 
2) SCO; no formal commitment towards democratic values. 
                                                                                                                                                        




It is worthwhile to note that the following thesis does not include the second category of 
normative leverage, i.e. ‘mass protests’ (Lebanidze 2019: 292), due to the  lack of precise data 
on the number of participants in protests in Georgia during the entire 2013-2019 period. In 
addition, various reliable sources present different data. For instance, according to British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (2019), the number of protesters in June 2019 in Georgia 
reached around 10 000, whereas Reuters (2019) states that approx. 20 000 people gathered in 
the same rally.  
 
4.4 Data collection and analysis                                                                                                                           
The following research aims to explore the causal relationship between China’s leverage and 
the quality of democracy of Georgia.  
The analysis evaluates Chinese, Russian and the EU economic, political, and normative 
leverages to Georgia. In order to assess the degrees of economic leverage, the study looks at 
secondary data: 1) on Georgian import from the external actors, i.e. China, the EU and Russia 
during the 2013-2019 period; 2) Georgian export to the external actors; 2) the Chinese, the EU 
and Russian FDI in Georgia (2013-2019); The annual statistical data are extracted from the 
webpage of the National Statistics Office of Georgia (geostat.ge) 
As for the evaluation of political leverage, the secondary data for categories, such as Georgia’s 
membership in regional organisations, the military presence of a regional actor in Georgia are 
analysed. The data are gathered from webpages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 
reliable media sources, such as Civil Georgia, Radio Liberty (RL), BBC, Xinhua, etc.  
As for the political leverage category – the need of diplomatic and political assistance from a 
regional actor – directed (deductive) qualitative content analysis is employed to collect data 
from Georgian national security concept documents conducted during the period between 2013 
and 2019. There are two documents which were adopted by the incumbent Georgian Dream in 
2012 and 2019. Analysing the National Security Concept document is essential for studying 
whether Georgia expects or relies on diplomatic/political assistance from the external actors in 
question. National Security Concept of Georgia (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012; 2019) 
are official documents elaborated by the GD ruling party, which explain ‘the vision of the 
nation’s secure development, threats, risks and challenges, and establishes the main directions 
for national security policy’. 
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For normative leverage – foreign policy aspiration of the incumbents and ideological affinity – 
directed qualitative content analysis is employed. The data on the Georgian government’s 
foreign policy aspiration towards the external actors in question is collected through directed 
qualitative content analysis of the Georgian foreign policy strategy documents. The documents 
explicitly define the Georgian foreign policy strategic goals and priorities elaborated by the 
incumbent Georgian Dream in 2012 and 2019. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2012; 
2019) The data for evaluating Georgian incumbents’ ideological affinity with external actors 
(China, the EU and Russia) is collected from the Georgian National Security Concept 
documents elaborated during the 2013-2019 period. The National Security Concept of Georgia 
(Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012; 2019) apart from defining the state’s security policy 
interests, defines ‘fundamental national values’. The data from the documents is collected 
through directed qualitative content analysis. 
Content analysis is a technique employed to assess textual data in different research designs. It 
is often used for quantification of content, i.e. for lexicometry ‘that relies on the automatic 
identification of word frequency which can be employed for conducting statistical analysis’. 
(Crespy 2015: 7)  
The following research employs qualitative content analysis since the aim of the research is not 
to identify all foreign policy strategies of Georgia to a variety of actors at large or the frequency 
of concepts, such as ‘security’, ‘need of assistance’ in National Security Concept and Foreign 
Policy Strategy documents. Lexicometry is not any added value due to the already set of 
leverage categories and scales. Instead, the analysis aims to identify manifest data showing 
whether Georgia relies on/expects external diplomatic assistance from regional actors (China, 
Russia, the EU), or whether the Georgian government is aspired for the membership in the EU 
or any regional organization led by China or Russia. The assessment is made whether the 
membership of a regional organization led by an external actor (such as the EU, NATO5, CIS, 
CSTO, EEU, SCO) is a foreign policy priority of the state. Hence, the analysis follows a 
deductive approach and employs a priori codes – the so-called codebook based on the leverage 
categories. (Crespy, 2015: 8- 9; Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999)  
 
5 NATO will be included since the majority of the organisation’s members are the EU members as well. In addition, 
NATO is a Western organization based on democratic values and countervails actors such as China, Russia, etc. 
The literature on external factors of regime changes usually considers as a democracy reinforcing organisation 
NATO along with the EU. (nato.int; Lebanidze 2019) 
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The pre-defined topics (codes) are evaluated according to the theoretical framework in the 
Georgian ‘strategies’ to ‘a pre-established list of actors’, that is China, Russia and the EU. The 
‘topics’ are identified in the text ‘quotations’ – sentences or chunks of sentences ‘accounting 
for an actor, discursive strategy, an object of evaluation, an evaluative statement and a 
secondary topic related to the central topic examined’. (Crespy 2015: 9)  
Lastly, the analysis, the variance of the degree of democracy of Georgia is compared against 
the variance of the leverage degrees of China, Russia and the EU in the period between the 
years 2013 and 2019 to depict whether there is causality between the changes in the degree of 


















Chapter 5 Discussion of Research Results  
The following chapter analyses the degrees of leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia. 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the modified LL model is employed in the thesis 
to assess the external actors’ economic, political and normative leverages to Georgia. China’s 
leverage to Georgia is compared to that of the EU in order to see whether China has outscored 
the EU in this regard. This serves to explain whether China has influenced Georgia’s quality of 
democracy during the 2013-2019 period. The degree of leverage of Russia to Georgia will be 
measured as well in order to minimise finding only correlation and instead to identify the 
causality between the degree of Chinese leverage and the degree of democracy in Georgia.  
 
5.1 Economic leverage  
The following section evaluates the degrees of economic leverage of China, Russia and the EU 
to Georgia to explore to what extent the country’s economy is dependent on the external actors. 
Thus, according to the modified LL model (See chapter 4), Georgia’s dependence on trade 
(import and export) with the external actors and FDI will be assessed.  
 
5.1.1 Export  
Georgian export to China, Russia and the EU has shown an upward trend throughout the period 
between 2013 and 2019. Figure 4 below depicts the cumulative figures of Georgian export in 
China. While in 2013, Georgia’s export to China was merely 34 million USD, in 2014 it tripled 
and reached 90.4 million USD. In the following years, the export grew considerably until 2018, 
when it dropped marginally from 202 million USD to 198 million USD. In 2019, Georgian 
export to China reached 227.6 million USD, which was seven times higher than the amount in 
2013. (geostat.ge) Despite this considerable growth, the share of Georgian export to China in 
the country’s total export has not been higher than 8.2% throughout the period in question. The 
amount of Georgian export to China has been relatively lower than the export amount to the 
EU and Russia. (geostat.ge) 
Georgian export to the EU amounted around 610 million USD in 2013 as it is illustrated in 
figure 4. The export started to increase in the following two years, albeit it dwindled to 565 
million USD in 2016. After that, it showed a sharp rise in the following years. Thus, in 2019, 
48 
 
Georgian export to the EU peaked at approximately 820 million USD. As a result, Georgian 
export to the EU increased by 200 million USD throughout the whole period in question. 
Despite that, the rate of Georgian export to the EU in the country’s total export showed a 
downward trend between 2015 and 2018, witnessing a recovery in 2019. Nevertheless, the share 
of Georgian export to the EU remained over 21% during the entire period. (geostat.ge) 
In 2013, the amount of Georgian export to Russia was 190.6 million USD. Despite the growth 
in the following year, the figure showed a significant decrease in 2015. As it is illustrated in 
figure 4, since 2016, Georgian export to Russia started to recover, reaching approximately 500 
million USD by 2019. Overall, the export to Russia has seen a 250% increase during the entire 
period between the years 2013 and 2019. However, even though there was a considerable 
growth, the Georgian export to Russia still amounted no more than 13% of the country’s total 
export by 2019, which is considerably lower than that of the EU. (National Statistic Office of 
Georgia) 
                                                                                                                                                
Figure 4. The amount of Georgian export to China, the EU and Russia (2013-2019) (million 
USD). Author’s elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
                                                                                                                                                        
As figure 4 demonstrates, Georgia has been more dependent on the EU in terms of export than 
China and Russia. The rate of Georgian export to the EU has been above 20% for the whole 















Georgian export to the EU or Russia. Nonetheless, the rate of export to China has been 
significantly below that of the EU and Russia.  
                                                                                                                                                         
5.1.2 Import  
As it is evident in figure 5, which depicts cumulative figures of Georgia’s import, Georgia’s 
import from China amounted 612 million USD in 2013. The amount of import from China 
increased to 734 million USD in 2014, after which it started to gradually drop in the following 
two years, falling to approximately 548 million USD in 2016. In 2017, the figure showed an 
upward trend and reached 859 million USD by 2019. Despite the overall increase, the share of 
import from China in Georgia’s overall import peaked at merely 9.4% in 2019, which compared 
to the EU’s import rate has been almost three times lower. (geostat.ge) 
Georgia’s import from the EU was the highest among all external actors in question. However, 
the amount of import has seen fluctuation for the entire period. In 2013, the import from the 
EU amounted around 2.3 billion USD. In 2014, the figure grew to approximately 2.4 billion 
USD, after which it fell to around 2.1 billion USD. In the following years, the amount of 
Georgia’s import from the EU started to grow unsteadily, peaking at 2.5 billion USD in 2018. 
Nevertheless, in 2019, the figure dropped to 2.3 billion USD. (See figure 5) Overall, throughout 
the 2013-2019 period, the amount of import from the EU has increased, albeit the share of the 
EU import in Georgia’s overall import fell from 28.2% in 2013 to 25.5% by 2019. (geostat.ge)  
As for Georgia’s import from Russia, it has seen a significant increase since the beginning of 
the period in question. As it is illustrated below in figure 5, in 2013, the amount of the import 
was 584 million USD, after which it fell slightly to just above 573 million USD. In the following 
years, the figure grew considerably, and it almost doubled in 2019, at 976 million USD. 
Nonetheless, the import from Russia has accounted for no more than 11% of the overall import 
in the country, which has been much lower than Georgia’s import rate from the EU. (geostat.ge) 
As it is illustrated in figure 5, similarly to export, Georgia has been more dependent on the EU 
with regard to import than China and Russia. The rate of Georgia’s import from the EU has 
been fluctuating between 25% and 31% for the period in question. Georgia’s import from China 
and Russia, however, has been much lower than that of the EU.  
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Figure 5. The amount of Georgia’s import from China, the EU and Russia (2013-2019) (million 
USD). Author’s elaboration (based on geostat.ge)  
 
5.1.3 Foreign direct investment  
Chinese FDI in Georgia amounted 101 million USD in 2013. In the following year, FDI doubled 
and reached 220 million USD. Despite this surge, the Chinese FDI started to fall gradually, and 
by 2019 it fell to approximately 40 million USD. (geostat.ge) This was caused by the fact that 
the Hualing Group has been the only leading company in terms of the FDI throughout the entire 
period. (Larsen 2017: 6) However, the counsellor in the economic and trade matters of the 
Chinese Embassy to Georgia, Liu Bo stated that since Georgia possesses an extremely 
appealing environment for investments, the decrease in the FDI does not mean that Georgia is 
not an appealing country for Chinese investors anymore. (Gasanova 2017) Despite that 
statement, Chinese FDI in Georgia has not shown any significant increase in the second part of 
the period as it is illustrated in figure 6.  
The amount of EU FDI in Georgia was 425 million USD in 2013. In 2014, the number soared 
to 836, after which it decreased to 816 million USD. From 2016 the EU FDI started to fluctuate 
and reached approximately 600 million USD in 2019. Despite the decrease since 2014, the 
amount of the EU FDI in Georgia still witnessed an overall growth between 2013 and 2019, 












total amount of FDI in Georgia accounted for 47.2% in 2019 as opposed to 40.9% in 2013, 
showing a significant increase. (geostat.ge)  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Figure 6. The amount of Chinese, the EU and Russian FDI in Georgia (2013-2019) (million 
USD). Author’s elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
 
Russian FDI in Georgia started at just around 8 million USD in 2013 and soared in the following 
year to approximately 90 million USD. In 2015, the figure fell to around 52 million USD, after 
which it witnessed fluctuation. In 2019, Russian FDI amounted 50.5 million USD. Since 2013 
the FDI increased almost seven times throughout the 2013-2019 period. Despite this increase, 
the share of Russian FDI in Georgia’s overall FDI has been much lower than that of the EU 
during the entire period. (geostat.ge) 
Overall, as figure 6 illustrates, Georgia has been much more dependent on the EU in terms of 
FDI than China and Russia. The share of the EU FDI in the total amount of investment in 
Georgia amounted more than 40% throughout the 2013-2019 period, except the year 2016, 
when the rate plummeted to 25%. Chinese and Russian FDI have been much lower than that of 
the EU and have not seen any significant increase. However, while investment from Russia has 















5.1.4 Summary                                                                                                                                                          
Despite the substantial growth of the economic ties between China and Georgia during the 
2013-2019 period, the former’s economic leverage to the latter has grown only marginally. As 
it was discussed above, China has accounted for a growing portion of Georgia’s foreign trade 
turnover and has become an important source of FDI since 2013. (Larsen 2017: 11) However, 
China’s economic leverage to Georgia has remained low, compared to the other external actors 
in the region, such as the EU and Russia. This is due to the unstable growth of Georgian export 
to China and the decrease of Chinese FDI in Georgia throughout the 2013-2019 period. Hence, 
China has had the lowest degree of leverage of the other two external actors.   
The degree of the EU’s economic leverage to Georgia between the years 2013 and 2019 has 
outscored that of China and Russia and has remained high for the entire six-year period. The 
trade turnover between the EU and Georgia has been growing steadily from 2.8 billion USD to 
3.2 billion USD between 2013 and 2019. (geostat.ge) The EU’s economic engagement in 
Georgia has accounted for an average of 25% of the country’s overall trade in the 2013-2019 
period. (ec.europa.eu) Apart from that, the EU FDI in Georgia has seen an overall increase as 
well. Thus, the EU has been the largest economic partner of Georgia, and the latter has been 
highly dependent on FDI and trade relations with the EU. (geostat.ge) 
                                                                                                                                                        
Figure 7. Dynamics of the degrees of economic leverage of China, the EU and Russia to 












As for Russia’s economic leverage to Georgia, it has seen an increase during the 2013-2019 
period. This is due to considerable growth in trade turnover between the two countries, even 
though Russian FDI in Georgia has remained low. The degree of Russia’s economic leverage 
between 2013 and 2016 has fluctuated and remained low. However, since 2017, it rose from 
low to medium. In 2018 and 2019, the degree of leverage continued to grow, albeit remained 
medium. Figure 7 above shows the dynamics of China’s, EU and Russia’s degrees of leverage 
to Georgia throughout the 2013-2019 period. 
 
5.2 Political leverage  
The following section evaluates the degrees of political leverage to explore to what extent 
Georgia is politically dependent on China, the EU and Russia. The section analyses following: 
whether Georgia is in need of diplomatic and political assistance from the external actors; 
whether the country is a member of regional organisations led by the external actors; whether 
there is a friendly or hostile military presence of the external actors in Georgia. 
The degree of political leverage shows the vulnerability of Georgia’s political regime towards 
the external actors in terms of domestic politics and security-related issues. When a target state 
has a security-related or political problem and necessitates an external actor’s diplomatic and/or 
political aid for its resolution, the state’s vulnerability towards this external actor’s influence is 
high. For instance, a country’s dependence on the EU’s assistance to resolve a security-related 
issue increases the EU’s leverage towards that state. (Lebanidze 2019: 115- 116; Levitsky and 
Way 2010: 43- 44) 
 
5.2.1 Civilian-military presence 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has played an important role in defining 
Georgia’s foreign policy strategies. Political ties between the two countries have been 
continuously tense since the 1990s. Even during the period of Eduard Shevardnadze’s 
presidency, the relations were unstable. The major factors were the Kremlin’s support to 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists, Russian military bases in Georgia and the 
incompatibility between the latter’s pro-Western aspirations with Moscow’s foreign policy 
goals. (Lebanidze 2019: 162)  
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The situation between the two states further worsened after the 2003 Rose Revolution in 
Georgia, when Mikheil Saakashvili’s government further undermined tense relations with harsh 
anti-Kremlin rhetoric. (McFarlane 2015: 4) As a response, Russia employed economic and 
energy-related mechanisms against Georgia, increasing oil and gas prices and eventually 
banned Georgian wine and mineral water imports in 2006. This was followed by suspending 
communication and transport links with Georgia and the deportation of Georgian citizens from 
Russia. (BBC 2006) The country’s economy and energy sector were largely dependent on 
Russia and Moscow had expectations that the aforesaid ‘sticks’ would deteriorate the Georgian 
economy. (Lebanidze 2019: 164) Nevertheless, these measures did not lead to the results 
Moscow had anticipated. The Georgian government successfully managed to recover the state’s 
economy after the loss of access to its largest export market. Thus, the undermined political and 
economic relations culminated into the military conflict in August 2008. (Lebanidze 2019: 164- 
165) 
The coercive power directed at Georgia following the war has largely affected Georgia’s 
foreign policy strategy since 20% of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory has been 
under Russian occupation since 2008. Moscow recognised the independence of Georgia’s 
breakaway territories after the end of the war. (Radio Liberty 2019) Having undermined 
Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and security, Russia tried to maintain political 
leverage to Georgia. Thus, in 2009, Russia established military bases both in Abkhazia as well 
as South Ossetia, which have been operating throughout the entire period between 2013 and 
2019 with a significant Russian military presence. Amounting approximately 4000 soldiers on 
the ground only in South Ossetia, Russian military presence has been posing an immense potent 
security threat to Georgia. (Komakhia 2017) 
Despite the tense political relations, the GD incumbents, after winning the 2012 elections, opted 
for a pragmatic politics towards Russia. The party tried to refresh deteriorated economic 
relations with Moscow. In 2012, a new position of the Special Representative for Relations with 
Russia was introduced by the newly elected government. (Agenda 2014) The GD appointed 
Abashidze as a Special Representative for Relations with Russia, which gave way to the so-
called Abakhidze-Karasin dialogue solely pertaining to economic matters. (Agenda 2019) The 
Prague meeting between the special representative of the Georgian Prime Minister, Zurab 
Abashidze and Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, Gregoriy Karasin, was followed by 
the restoration of access to the Russian market for Georgian agricultural production. (Agenda 
2019) The ruling party tried to establish a dialogue with Moscow regarding trade issues. This 
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served to resolve relations between the two counties with discussions on topics ‘that can be 
calculated’ instead of addressing geopolitical issues. (Kuchins et al, 2016: 12) The major aim 
of the GD has been the preservation of economic linkages and people-to-people contacts due 
to the geographic closeness and Russia’s significance as an economic partner. (Kuchins et al, 
2016: 12) As a result, economic relations between the two countries recovered. For instance, in 
2013, the ban which Moscow had imposed on the Georgian agricultural products and wine in 
2006 was lifted. (Buckley 2013) Since then, Russia became one of the biggest trade partners 
for Georgia. (geostat.ge)  
Despite these changes and the Georgian government’s active pursuit of the pragmatic policy 
and conflict de-escalation, the situation regarding the Russian occupation has not witnessed any 
positive shifts. (McFarlane 2015: 18; Kuchins et al, 2016: 32) The ‘creeping occupation’ and 
borderisation from South Ossetia have taken place systematically throughout the period 
between the years 2013 and 2019. (Information Development Freedom Institute 2015) The 
continuous hostile military presence has given Russia the main source of its political leverage 
to Georgia. Thus, the incumbent GD has continuously seen the Russian occupation of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as the primary security threat for the country. (Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 2012; 2019)  
In order to infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia 
and to limit its free and democratic choice, in August 2008 the Russian 
Federation perpetrated a further military aggression. (Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 2012: 7) 
Unlike Russia, China has neither posed any military threat to Georgia to acquire political 
leverage through deterrence nor has possessed any friendly military or civilian presence in 
Georgia. (mfa.gov.ge) Political aspects of the relations between China and Georgia have merely 
pertained to the issues of mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity. (Stronski and 
Vreeman 2017; mfa.gov.ge)  
Similarly to China, the EU has had no military presence in Georgia during the 2013-2019 
period. However, the EU has had an important civil presence in Georgia playing a significant 
role for the country’s security. The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is an 
unarmed civilian monitoring mission, which was introduced by the EU on 15th September 2008, 
after the Russo-Georgian war. The EUMM consists of approximately 200 monitors ensuring 
‘the stabilization of the situation on the ground’ since the conflict and encompasses the entire 
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internationally recognized territory of Georgia. (www.eumm.eu) The mission’s primary 
objective is the prevention of new armed conflicts and provision of the security and safety of 
Georgian citizens in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (www.eumm.eu) 
The Georgian ruling party has seen the EU’s engagement as ‘consumption of security’ and has 
been relying on the EUMM’s presence at the ABL (Administrative borderline) with regard to 
circumventing any potential threat from the Russian Federation. (Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 2012: 16; 2019: 17) 
International support for Georgia, as well as the presence of the European 
Union Monitoring Mission on the ground, are important deterrents to possible 
aggression. (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2019: 10) 
Thus, the EU’s civilian presence in Georgia increases the former’s leverage to the latter, 
since the mission has played a critical role for the country’s security. 
 
5.2.2 Diplomatic assistance  
While it has occupied 20% of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory, Russia has not 
fulfilled the 2008 Agreement on Ceasefire and does not take responsibility not to attack the 
country. (Tabula 2017) Hence, the Georgian government has not expected any diplomatic or 
political assistance from the Russian Federation with regard to the conflict resolution. For 
instance, Moscow has blocked the deployment of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions in 
the conflict zones and has resisted the EUMM to fully implement its mandate in the occupied 
territories. (Tabula 2017) These actions have continuously raised the Georgian government’s 
expectations regarding another possible security threat from Russia. (Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 2012: 8; 2019: 10)  
Despite strengthening relations, the Georgian government has not relied on or expected 
diplomatic or political support from China either. The 2012 and 2019 National Security Concept 
documents (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 21; 2019: 23) have only emphasised merely 
deepening economic relations and political dialogue with Beijing. China’s goal to connect to 
Europe, however, complies with one of the priorities of Georgia, which sees its geographical 
location as an advantageous and aims at utilising it for connecting Europe and Asia. According 
to the Georgian foreign policy strategy documents, this advantageous location can foster the 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, it does not go beyond this general 
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statement. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2012; 2019) In addition, the meetings 
between governmental representatives, such as prime ministers and foreign ministers of both 
countries throughout the 2013-2019 period mostly pertained to trade, economic relations, 
investments, infrastructure projects. (Kvirikashvili 2014; Gharibashvili 2015; Kvirikashvili 
2015; Kvirikashvili 2017; Bakhtadze 2018; Bakhtadze 2019; Bakhtadze 2019b; Zalkaliani 
2019) Moreover, the bilateral agreements between the countries have mostly encompassed 
economic and trade-related issues. For instance, the 2013 Agreement on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation and the FTA between the two states. (Legislative Herald of Georgia 
2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2013) In 2017, Georgia 
and China signed the FTA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2017), which came into 
force in 2018, led to the elimination of tariffs on 96.5% of Chinese and 93.9% of Georgian 
export products. (Nan and Xu 2017) 
It is worthwhile to note that relations between Georgia and China are mostly held on an 
economic level. The official diplomatic relations between China and Georgia started on 9th 
June in 1992. (mfa.gov.ge) However, the relations witnessed a considerable growth only in the 
first part of the 2010s due to China’s more active engagement in the region after the introduction 
of the SREB and Maritime Silk Road (MSR), together referred to as OBOR6 (BRI), by Xin 
Jinping. (Charaia et al, 2020: 4- 6; geostat.ge) The introduction of this project was followed by 
the strengthening of the Sino-Georgian economic ties. (Shattuck 2019: 3)  
Beijing has continuously supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and has 
not recognised the independence of de facto Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For instance, in 
September 2008, after the Russo-Georgian war, Foreign Minister of China Qin Gang expressed 
concerns regarding ‘the latest developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’. (Xinhua News 
Agency 2008) In response, Georgia has supported ‘One China Principle’ and has not recognised 
Taiwan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2018)   
Despite the aforesaid, China’s engagement in Georgia has not been seen as an important factor 
for the resolution of the security issues by the government. The GD has deemed it merely an 
opportunity for developing the country’s economy, avoiding the recognition of Georgia’s 
breakaway regions and bolstering peace in the future. Due to that, the ruling party has been 
aspired to ensure China’s continuous support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
6 Since 2016, One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) is referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 
OBOR implies solely a single road, whereas BRI better reflects multiple routes of the initiative. (Stanzel 2017) 
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This has been emphasized by various representatives of the Georgian government. 
(Kvirikashvili 2015b; Kvirikashvili 2017b; Gharibashvili 2015b; Bakhtadze 2019) For 
instance, in his interview from the city of Dalian, China, Georgia’s former Prime Minister Irakli 
Gharibashvili (2015b: 2:00- 2:40) pointed out that,  
The resurrection of the New Silk Road is creating new opportunities for 
Georgia. This will lead to new investments, development, trade activation. 
Our major aim, the mission of our country is utilising our strategic location 
efficiently at its best. We do not want Georgia to be a reason for 
confrontations. We would like our country to be a place for reconciliation, 
negotiations, consensus, and peace for the most part. 
In 2019, former Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze (2019), at the meeting with 
Chinese Prime Minister in Dalian, China, highlighted China’s importance for Georgia’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty.   
China and Georgia understand fundamental issues in the same way, among 
them matters of territorial integrity. I would like to thank you for supporting 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of my nation. (Bakhtadze 2019: 1:25-
1:42) 
On the contrary, while the Georgian ruling elites have not expected China to help Georgia with 
the resolution of the security issue, they have largely relied on the role of the EU with regard to 
avoiding possible security threats and achieving de-occupation of the breakaway territories. 
According to the Georgian foreign policy strategy documents of 2012-2018 and 2019-2022 as 
well as the National Security Concept of the country (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 
2019), the membership in the EU along with NATO is one of the major priorities of the ruling 
party’s foreign policy and security priorities to ensure the state’s security and conflict 
resolution. Thus, the incumbent GD has expectance that the EU, along with NATO, are 
guarantees for the country’s security and resolution of the conflict with Russia.   
Membership in the EU and NATO is the most important guarantee for 
security, development and prosperity of Georgia. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Georgia 2019: 4)  
Similarly, according to the National Security Concepts of Georgia (Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 2012: 3; 2019: 7, 16- 18), the EU along with NATO are of utmost importance for 
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Georgia’s security. The government has seen the EU as the major mediator in conflict resolution 
and ‘peaceful coexistence’ with Russia. (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 17; 2019: 17-
18) The documents state, ‘Georgia places special emphasis on more active EU involvement in 
resolving the Russian-Georgian conflict.’ (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 17; 2019: 18- 
19) 
Furthermore, the Georgian ruling elites have been aspired to maintain the effective operation 
of the EUMM mandate throughout the whole period between the years 2013 and 2019. (Foreign 
Policy Strategy of Georgia 2012: 4) As it is highlighted in the documents of the National 
Security Concept of Georgia (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 11- 12; 2019: 12- 13), the 
mission ‘is important for Georgia’ since it facilitates ‘an effective peace process and the 
establishment of long-term peace’.  
 
5.2.3 Membership in regional organisations 
Georgia is not part of any organisations or security-related cooperation led by China, such as 
the SCO, which was established in 2001 in Shanghai. (mfa.gov.ge; eng.sectsco.org) Hence, 
China does not have substantial political leverage to Georgia.  
Georgia is not a member of the EU or NATO either. (mfa.gov.ge) Political as well as economic 
integration of Georgia with the EU started to deepen in the framework of the EaP, which was 
introduced in 2009. (geostat.ge; Chkhikvadze 2019: 59- 60) The EaP is not an alternative to the 
EU membership. However, it fosters the EaP countries in deepening of integration processes 
with the EU in different directions, such as spreading democratic values, strengthening security 
and sustainable development in the region. (ec.europa.eu) The partnership has two dimensions, 
bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral partnership includes the further deepening of 
cooperation with the AAs between the EaP states and the EU. As for the multilateral 
partnership, it fosters cooperation in mutual interest spheres, such as security, migration, trade, 
transport, energy, environment, etc. (Gogolashvili 2019) Despite these close relations, Georgia 
has neither become a member of the EU or NATO nor has applied for the EU membership.  
Georgia has not been part of Russia-led organisations throughout the 2013-2019 period either. 
In 2009, one year after the Russo-Georgian war, the United Nationalist Movement (UNM) 
ruling party made a decision to leave the CIS, which was created by Russia in 1991.   
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The CIS totally failed as an international organization. It is some kind of post-
Soviet kind of thing, that basically could not do anything to prevent this 
tragedy from happening. And, you know, by leaving the CIS, we are giving 
final [goodbyes] to the Soviet Union. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
2009) 
Since then, Georgia has not become a member of the CIS. Furthermore, as table 6 illustrates, 








CIS No (since 2009)  
CSTO No 
                                                                                                                                                  
Table 6. Georgia’s membership in regional organisations (2013-2019). Author’s elaboration 
(based on mfa.gov.ge)  
                                                                                                                                                               
5.2.4 Summary  
China’s political leverage to Georgia throughout the 2013-2019 period has remained medium 
(1.33) since the Sino-Georgian relations have not encompassed political and security-related 
issues. The focus of diplomatic exchanges between the countries is related to strengthening 
economic ties between the two actors. As table 7 below shows, political ties have not been 
strong since 1) China has not possessed any kind of military or civil presence Georgia; 2) 
Georgia has not relied on China’s political or diplomatic assistance to resolve its security 
problems with Russia; 3) Georgia has not been part of any regional organisation led by China, 
such as the SCO. The sole political aspect of the Sino-Georgian relations has pertained to 
mutual support of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which has not affected the degree of 
China’s political leverage to Georgia significantly. (See figure 8) 
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Unlike China, the degree of the EU’s political leverage to Georgia has been high throughout 
the 2013-2019 period. As table 7 and figure 8 show, the EU political leverage has largely 
outscored the Russian and Chinese leverage. This is due to the following factors. Firstly, 
Georgia has largely relied on the EU’s role and presence in resolving the security issue with the 
Russian Federation. Secondly, the EU has had a civilian presence, i.e. EUMM, in the country 
which has played a significant role for the country’s security. The only factor that has negatively 
affected the degree of the EU’s political leverage to Georgia is the lack of membership in the 
EU or NATO.  
 
Political leverage indicator 
Level 
China EU Russia  
Diplomatic assistance  2 3 2 
Membership in regional organisations 1 1 1 
Civil-military presence 1 3 3 
Leverage measurements: 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
 
Table 7.  Measurement of the degrees of Chinese, the EU and Russian political leverage to 
Georgia (2013-2019). Author’s elaboration 
 
As for the degree of Russia’s political leverage, it has been medium throughout the whole period 
between 2013 and 2019 as it is depicted in figure 8 below. This is due to Russia’s continuous 
military presence in Georgia, which has continuously undermined Georgia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and has been perceived as a top security threat by the Georgian ruling elites.  
Despite that, Russia’s political leverage to Georgia has remained medium since the ruling party 
has neither been a member of Russian-led regional organisation and nor it has relied on or 
expected Russia’s diplomatic support for the resolution of the security challenge. Thus, as the 
figure 8 depicts, Russia’s leverage to Georgia has been lower than the EU leverage and higher 




                                                                                                                                                                           
Figure 8. Dynamics of the degrees of political leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia 
(2013-2019) (low = 0-1; medium = 1-2; high = 2-3). Author’s elaboration 
 
5.3. Normative Leverage  
As it was discussed in chapter 3, under normative leverage two following factors are analysed: 
1) the incumbents’ foreign policy aspirations for integration with the regional actors and 2) the 
incumbents’ commitment to liberal-democratic values. Thus, normative leverage encompasses 
domestic incumbents’ foreign policy and normative aspirations. (Lebanidze 2019: 111- 112)  
The Georgian ruling elites have been at least formally committed to liberal-democratic values, 
being aspired to develop stronger democratic institutions. According to the documents of the 
National Security Concept (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 4; 2019: 4), Georgia has 
adhered ‘to democratic values and principles’, and has been aspired to foster ‘a system of 
democratic governance in which state power is limited by law and distributed among the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches’. The Georgian government has been committed to 
ensuring ‘the rule of law, pluralism and the protection of the rights of minorities’ and to 
‘strengthen civil society and other democratic institutions’. The GD’s pursuit to the democratic 
values counters authoritarian norms and values promoted by Russia and China, which affects 













As for the Georgian incumbents’ foreign policy strategies, namely aspiration to integrate in 
regional organisations led by the external actors under the study, the GD has not been aspired 
to obtain membership of China-led regional organisations, such as the SCO. Strengthening 
friendly relations and economic cooperation with China has been one of the priorities of 
Georgia, along with other Asia-Pacific states throughout the 2013-2018 period. The GD has 
emphasised the importance of cooperation in the spheres of trade, economic, transport and 
transit. In the 2019 foreign policy strategy document of Georgia, the China-Georgian FTA 
maximisation is emphasized as well. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2012; 2019) 
The government of Georgia has seen the Chinese BRI as the means of establishing the country 
into a transport hub between the East and West, since the country has a strategically significant 
location with ports in the Black Sea providing the Asian countries, including China, easy access 
to the European markets. (Gakharia 2019) The GD thus started to brand the country as a 
‘gateway’ and ‘bridge’ between the two continents, looking at the project as a highly beneficial 
opportunity. (Shattuck 2019: 2) According to the incumbent GD, this opportunity can lead to 
the improvement of Georgia’s regional connectivity and thus the development of the country’s 
economy and the invigoration of trade flow. (Kvirikashvili 2017) Former President of Georgia 
Giorgi Margvelashvili (2018), stated, ‘we look at China's development as a rare and great 
opportunity.’ 
Despite the aforesaid, throughout the six years between 2013 and 2019, the foreign policy 
strategies towards China has not seen a considerable shift since the objectives have mostly 
pertained to economic issues. Thus, China’s normative leverage to Georgia has been low for 
the entire period. (See table 8) 
Unlike China, the EU’s normative leverage to Georgia has been high throughout the whole 
period under the study. (See table 8) While Georgia has remained beyond the EU’s borders, 
one of the major foreign policy goals of the Georgian incumbents has been the integration and 
obtaining membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions, i.e. the EU and NATO. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2012; 2019) Furthermore, as it was mentioned above, they have 
been at least formally committed to democratic values. The EU institutions, such as the EC and 
EP, have been monitoring democratic processes and have contributed to the democratic 
development of the country. (Lebanidze and Grigalashili 2018)  
Furthermore, the aspiration towards the EU and NATO membership has had strong support 
from the government as well as the majority of the Georgian society. (National Democratic 
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Institute 2019) One of the major stimuli of this objective has been the Russian occupation and 
its support to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Lebanidze 2019: 162) This 
is due to the increase of the EU’s political importance for Georgia after the 2004 enlargement, 
after which the EU introduced the ENP with the purpose of promoting prosperity, stability, and 
security across the EU’s new neighbouring states ‘to avoid new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours’. (ec.europa.eu; Gogolashvili 2019)  
The Georgian government’s aspiration towards the integration with the EU has been 
demonstrated by becoming a ‘frontrunner’ state of the EaP, as recognized from the EC. 
(Blockmans 2018) In the framework of the EaP, Georgia concluded the AA with the EU, 
entering into force on 1st July 2016. The AA is an action plan with the objective of Georgia’s 
legislative approximation to the EU law, political association and gradual economic integration. 
(ec.europa.eu; European Commission 2014) It also included the introduction of the visa regime 
liberalization for Georgian citizens. The DCFTA is one of the most significant parts of the AA 
and functions as a mechanism for economic integration and opens up the EU market for 
Georgia, boosting the country’s export potential. (European Union External Action 2018; 
Information Development Freedom Institute 2014) Under the agreement, almost all customs 
duties have been removed on all types of Georgian production. (ec.europa.eu; Chkhikvadze 
2019: 61-66) Thus, due to the Georgian government’s continuous aspiration towards the 
membership and at least formal commitment towards liberal-democratic values, the EU’s 
normative leverage to Georgia has been high in the 2013-2019 period, as it is illustrated in table 
8 below. 
Unlike the EU, Russia’s normative leverage to Georgia has been low for the entire period 
between 2013 and 2019, as it is shown in table 8 below. Firstly, the Georgian government has 
declared a commitment to democratic values, which contradicts Russia’s authoritarian norms. 
(Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012; 2019)   
Secondly, a low degree of normative leverage has been largely caused by the on-going Russian 
military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These security challenges posed by the 
Russian Federation have been the major priority of the Georgian government to resolve. The 
Russian government has breached the Ceasefire agreement and have continued to occupy the 
Georgian proper. This has been referred to as ‘the creeping occupation’ by the Georgian 
government. (Tabula 2017) Furthermore, Russia has undertaken borderisation of the occupied 
regions, which has caused deterioration of human rights of the Georgian citizens. (Information 
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Development Freedom Institute 2015) Thus, the GD has accused Russia of breaching the 
country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights of Georgian citizens. The 
documents of the National Security Concept of Georgia (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012; 
2019) state, 
Regular and severe human rights violations by the proxy regimes and the 
Russian occupation forces in the occupied regions are alarming. Georgian 
citizens living in the occupied territories are systematically persecuted 
because of their ethnicity, while attempts to artificially change the 
demographic balance continue. Georgia is concerned about the threat that the 
occupation creates for the ethnic and cultural identity of the Abkhaz. 
(Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012: 8; 2019: 8- 9)  
Apart from that, the GD has deemed the Russian occupation not only a threat from a security 
perspective, but an obstacle aimed at reversing the country’s aspiration to integrate in the 
Western institutions. This position is underlined in the documents of National Security Concept 
of Georgia (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2012; 2019) 
The Russian Federation aims to turn Georgia into a failed state, to hinder the 
realisation of Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic choice, and to forcibly 
return Georgia to the Russian political orbit. (Ministry of Defence of Georgia 
2019: 10) 
Hence, the Russian occupation and potential security threat have been deemed as attempts to 
hinder not only Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but also to reverse the country’s 
democratic development. The Russian strategy has been aimed at destabilizing democracy and 
halting liberal international norms. (Lebanidze 2019: 182- 183; Levitsky and Way 2020: 53) 
The Russian government has seen ‘independent and democratic Georgia as an important threat’. 
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Normative leverage indicator Level 
China EU Russia 
Foreign policy strategies and 
ideological affinity 
1 3 1 
Leverage measurements: 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high 
                                                                                                                                                          
Table 8.  The degrees of Chinese, the EU and Russian normative leverage to Georgia (2013-
2019). Author’s elaboration  
 
5.4 The overall degrees of leverage   
The chapter evaluated the degrees of leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia. Overall, 
as figure 9 demonstrates, the EU’s leverage to Georgia has been the highest as opposed to that 
of China and Russia. This is due to 1) the dense economic and trade ties between the actors; 2) 
the Georgian incumbents’ pro-Western policies, i.e. aspiration towards the EU membership; 3) 
the dependence and expectation for political/diplomatic aid from the EU with regard to 
resolving the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and avoiding potent security 
threats in this regard. 
Since 2013, The EU’s political leverage has remained substantially high. (See figure 9) The 
EU’s political leverage pertained to political, military and security issues and the actor’s crucial 
role for Georgia’s security in terms of the maintenance of peace and conflict de-escalation. The 
EU’s civilian mission has been the only international presence ensuring the security at the ABL 
since the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Despite the fact that the EUMM does not 
comprise a military force and its activities are somewhat limited, its presence has been 
continuously deemed as crucial by the Georgian incumbents, in terms of sustaining peace, 
preventing further aggression from Russia and fostering conflict resolution. (Ministry of 
Defence of Georgia 2012; 2019) Apart from that, an institutional framework between the EU-
Georgia, that is the AA, has defined democratic reforms Georgia has pursued to implement. 
(European Commission 2014) 
Russian leverage has been medium for the entire period. Nevertheless, it has seen an increase 
as it is illustrated in figure 9. The major lever of Russia to Georgia has hinged on the military 
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presence and occupation of 20% of the latter’s internationally recognised territories. Georgia 
broke off diplomatic ties with Russia on 2nd September 2008, almost a month after the Russian 
military aggression. (mfa.gov.ge) Thus, the GD has had no expectations of the Russian 
diplomatic assistance to resolve the conflict and has primarily relied on the  EU’s support, Euro-
Atlantic integration and the engagement of the international community. (Ministry of Defence 
of Georgia 2012; 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2012; 2019) Moreover, in 2014, 
despite Moscow’s negative warnings, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili signed the 
AA with the EU. (Jamestown Foundation 2014) 
It is worthwhile to note that the economic relations between Georgia and Russia have seen 
improvement since 2013 and the growth of Russia’s leverage to Georgia largely depended on 
this factor. Russia’s normative leverage to Georgia has been low throughout the entire 2013-
2019 period due to Russia’s coercive measures towards Georgia. The major priority of the 
Georgian government has been de-occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has not 
been achieved yet. Apart from that, the Georgian proper has seen continuous ‘the creeping 
occupation’ and borderisation, which has largely caused deterioration of human rights of the 
Georgian citizens in the breakaway regions. (Tabula 2017) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Figure 9. The degrees of leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia during (2013-2019) 












As it is depicted in figure 9, China’s leverage to Georgia has remained low for the entire period 
between the years 2013 and 2019. The degree of Chinese leverage has seen merely a marginal 
increase during the six-year period, from 0.96 to 1. While the GD has seen benefits in China’s 
active engagement in the region, the Chinese factor in Georgia’s economy has been relatively 
lower than that of the EU and Russia. (geostat.ge) The active Chinese engagement in the region 
has been seen as an opportunity not only for the sustainable development of Georgia but also 
for transforming Georgia into a peaceful hub – ‘a place for reconciliation, negotiations, 
consensus, and peace for the most part’. (Gharibashvili 2015b: 2:00- 2:40) Nevertheless, 
political relations between the two countries have not witnessed any significant growth.  
China’s normative leverage to Georgia has been low also due to the lack of the GD’s interest 
to integrate in the SCO. In addition to that, the Georgian government has been at least formally 
committed to democratic values and aspired for the EU membership. (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Georgia 2012; 2019) Georgia signed the AA with the EU and pursued the 
harmonization process of the Georgian legislation with the EU law (ec.europa.eu), which are 
contradictory with authoritarian norms.  
 
 
Figure 10. Dynamics of the degree of democracy in Georgia (2013-2019). Author’s elaboration 
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The degree of China’s leverage has been continuously low and has not seen any significant 
increase between the years 2013 to 2019. Additionally, as figures 9 and 10 illustrate, the 
variation of the degree of China’s leverage to Georgia does not demonstrate any causal relation 























Chapter 6. Conclusions 
The aim of the following factor-centric single case study was to analyse whether China has 
affected the quality of democracy in Georgia throughout the 2013-2019 period. The study 
initially identified the research problem in the literature on China’s influence on Georgia’s 
domestic quality and set objectives to answer the following questions: 
• How does China influence the democratic quality in Georgia?  
• What is the degree of China’s economic, political, and normative leverage to Georgia? 
The thesis then introduced the neo-Institutionalist theoretical framework, which frames the 
promotion of democratic and authoritarian regimes. After that, it employed the combined 
analytical framework of the Sociological and Rationalist Institutionalism theories and the 
modified Linkage and Leverage model. This served to explain the puzzle of the study, i.e. lack 
of empiricism and theorisation, identified in the state of art.  
Next, the research moved on to the analysis of the degrees of leverages for evaluating China’s 
influence of autocracy promotion in Georgia. Thus, the Linkage and Leverage analytical model 
evaluated China’s economic, political and normative leverage to Georgia. This showed how 
strong China’s strategies of autocracy promotion have been in Georgia during the 2013-2019 
period. Additionally, the analysis assessed leverage of the democracy and autocracy promoting 
external actors – Russia and the EU to Georgia – in order to avoid merely claiming the 
correlation and instead to demonstrate the causality between the independent and dependent 
variables – the degree of democracy in Georgia and the degree of China’s leverage to Georgia. 
The research employed secondary data collection methods, such as statistical data gathering 
and directed (deductive) content analysis to identify specific data and themes for studying 
Chinese, Russian and the EU political and normative leverages to Georgia.  
The study revealed that the Chinese leverage to Georgia has been constantly low (between 0.96- 
1.02) for the 2013-2019 period and has remained significantly lower than that of the EU, which 
enjoyed a constant high leverage degree to Georgia (2.78), as well as the degree of Russia’s 
leverage (1.19-1.37). This means that China has had no impact on the quality of democracy in 
Georgia throughout the 2013-2019 period. 
The EU, unlike China, has been the largest trade and economic partner for Georgia. The EU’s 
diplomatic engagement in the country has been seen as a potential remedy to the top security 
threat of the country – the Russian occupation – and therefore, the incumbents have been aspired 
71 
 
for gaining the membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, i.e. the EU and NATO, for the 
entire period between 2013 and 2019.  
On the contrary, the Georgian government has not shown any interest towards the membership 
of the China-led SCO. Georgia has been a member of the AIIB, albeit it is worthwhile to note 
that the broader literature on autocracy promotion by China argues that there is no evidence to 
claim that the AIIB promotes autocracy. (Levitsky and Way 2020; Vieira 2018: 7) Therefore, 
it was not considered as a factor for determining the degree of China’s leverage in the following 
study.  
The literature review has shown that China employs two strategies to promote autocracy abroad. 
These are socialisation (integration) and soft power. The research assessed the influence of 
these strategies in Georgia by measuring the degrees of economic, political and normative 
leverage. The study has revealed that due to low degrees of these leverage categories, none of 
China’s strategies of autocracy promotion has had any substantial impact on the democracy 
quality in Georgia during the 2013-2019 period. 
Having assessed normative leverage, the study also revealed that, the Chinese soft power in 
Georgia has remained weak due to the latter’s pro-EU aspirations and at the declared 
commitment to democratic values. The GD signed the AA with the EU, after which it pursued 
the AA agenda implementation with the objective of Georgia’s gradual economic and political 
integration with the EU, including the harmonisation of the Georgian legislation with the EU 
law. (European Commission 2014) 
As for China’s political and economic integration strategies of autocracy promotion, they have 
had no (or insignificant) influence as well. China has had medium political (1.33) and low 
economic leverage (between 0.56- 0.73) to Georgia during the 2013-2019 period. The analysis 
showed that the integration between Georgia and China has been weak since Georgia has not 
become part of the SCO, nor it has had considerably denser economic ties with China, as 
opposed to Russia or the EU. Thus, it can be argued that China’s both instruments in the region, 
i.e. soft power and economic and political integration, have not yet found a strong foothold in 
Georgia and thus cannot influence the democracy quality in the country. 
The study encompassed several limitations. The timeframe of the 2013-2019 period, which has 
been set in the research, can be considered one of them. It can be fascinating to look at a more 
extended period, which could show different patterns with regard to the democratic quality in 
Georgia and external influences.  
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Secondly, the study aimed at illustrating a general empirical picture to reveal whether China 
possesses an impact on Georgia’s democracy quality. Nonetheless, more in-depth analysis can 
be carried out on domestic policies implemented by the Georgian government and their 
compatibility with China’s or other actors’ norms and values. Further research can also employ 
an alternative structural approach, which has been originally followed by Levitsky and Way 
(2010). In this case, unlike the neo-Institutionalist approach employed here, the focus can be 
put on structural factors, i.e. organisational power of domestic incumbents. This will serve to 
analyse how external influences impact on the state’s coercive power, party cohesion, state 
cohesion, etc.  
Another prospective for further research can be a comparative study, exploring influences of 
more actors in the region, such as the US, Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, the CIS states, etc. The 
future studies can also follow a medium and large-N case study design to look at China’s impact 
on democracy trajectories in all post-Soviet or EaP countries as well as other regions, such as 
CEE. It is also interesting to look at the impact China could have on Russia’s foreign and 
domestic policies in the post-Soviet space. Last but not least, similar research should be 
conducted to identify any possible change in China’s influence on Georgia in the future. 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, it can be concluded that the following thesis has 
demonstrated a relevant and interesting approach to study changes in the democratic quality 
from the perspective of external factors. The study successfully modified the Linkage and 
Leverage analytical framework and employed it along with the theories of Sociological and 
Rational Choice Institutionalism. Following the neo-Institutionalist approach, the research tried 
to avoid diminishing the importance of domestic factors, such as incumbents’ foreign policy 
aspirations and their commitment to democratic norms. Overall, the thesis has contributed to 
the literature exploring changes of the quality of democracy, the external dimension of regime 
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Appendix 1. Georgian export to China, the EU and Russia (million USD). (geostat.ge) 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 34 90.4 125.8 174.3 201.7 198 227.6 
EU 607.2 624.2 644.7 565.7 655.4 730.7 819.3 
Russia  190.6 274.8 162.9 206 396.7 436.6 497.3 
World  2910.3 2861 2204.2 2113 2735.8 3355.8 3769.4 
 
Appendix 2. Shares of Georgian export to China, the EU and Russia. Author’s Elaboration 
(based on geostat.ge) 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 1.2% 3.1% 5.7% 8.2% 7.4% 5.9% 6% 
EU 20.9% 21.8% 29.2% 26.8% 24% 21.8% 21.7% 
Russia  6.5% 9.6% 7.4% 9.3% 14.5% 13% 13.2% 
 
Appendix 3. Georgia’s import from China, the EU and Russia (million USD). (geostat.ge) 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 612.2 733.5 587.3 547.5 732.6 833.9 858.6 
EU 2266.1 2372 2080.9 2215 2200.7 2506.1 2331.5 
Russia  583.9 573.3 625.1 675.6 786.9 934 976.2 




Appendix 4. Shares of Georgia’s import from China, the EU and Russia in total import. 
Author’s Elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 7.6% 8.5% 8% 7.5% 9.2% 9.1% 9.4% 
EU 28.2% 27.6% 28.5% 30.4% 27.7% 27.4% 25.5% 
Russia  7.3% 6.7% 8.6% 9.2% 9.9% 10.2% 10.7% 
 
Appendix 5. Chinese, EU and Russian Foreign Direct Investment in Georgia (million USD). 
(geostat.ge) 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 101.1 220.1 66.9 25.5 19.3 75.7 40.4 
EU 425.1 836 816.3 412.6 804.3 590.1 598.5 
Russia  7.8 87.9 52.4 28.4 51.3 69.7 50.5 
World  1039.2 1837 1729.1 1650.3 1962.6 1265.2 1267.7 
 
Appendix 6. Shares of Chinese, EU and Russian Foreign Direct Investment in Georgia. 
Author’s Elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 9.7% 12% 3.9% 1.5% 1% 6% 3.2% 
EU 40.9% 45.5% 47.2% 25.2% 41% 46.6% 47.2% 





Appendix 7. The Degrees of Economic Leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia. 
Author’s elaboration  
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 0.56 0.72 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.73 0.71 
EU 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Russia  0.59 0.79 0.62 0.74 1.03 1.09 1.11 
 
Appendix 8. The Degrees of leverage of China, the EU and Russia to Georgia. Author’s 
elaboration 
Regional actor 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
China 0.96 1.02 0.96 0.98 1 1.02 1.01 
EU 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 
Russia  1.19 1.26 1.21 1.25 1.34 1.36 1.37 
 
Appendix 9. Content Analysis. (National Security Concept of Georgia 2012-2018) 
Questions:  
1. Does Georgia expect diplomatic/political assistance from a regional actor to solve its 
security challenge and/or threat, such as the EU, China, Russia? 
2. Does Georgia rely on diplomatic/political assistance from a regional actor to solve it 
security challenge and/or threat, such as the EU, China, Russia?  
The EU  




Reliance on support 
 
‘International support for Georgia, as well as 
the presence of the European Union 
Monitoring Mission on the ground, are 







(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s reliance on 
political/diplomatic 
assistance    from an external 





‘The Government of Georgia believes that 
the only efficient means for defusing tensions 
is the creation of a peaceful mechanism to 
provide for the withdrawal of Russian troops 
from the occupied territories, and the 
deployment of international 
peacekeeping/police forces there. 
Consequently, the European Union 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is important 
for Georgia.’ 
 
‘Georgia is not only a consumer of security, 
but also shares responsibility for collective 
security and actively participates in 
international missions.’ 
 
‘Deepening cooperation with the EU 
supports the further strengthening of 
Georgia’s democratic institutions and 
security, as well as its economic integration 
with the EU.’ 
 
‘Georgia places special emphasis on more 
active EU involvement in resolving the 
Russian- Georgian conflict.’ 
 
‘It is of principal importance to Georgia that 
the EU, as the mediator of the Russian-
Georgian Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 
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2008, exercise effective influence on the 
Russian Federation to fulfil the norms of 
international law and the international 
obligations it has undertaken.’ 
 
 
Expectance for support  
  
(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s expectation of 
political/diplomatic 
assistance    from an external 
actor to resolve the security 
issue/threat) 
‘Broadening the integration processes in 
Europe is important for the security of 
Georgia. Georgia is a part of the European 
and Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore, the 
expansion eastward of NATO and of the 
European Union is important for Georgia.’ 
  
‘The EUMM also must cover the occupied 
territories, consistent with the EUMM’s 
mandate. This will facilitate an effective 
peace process and the establishment of long-
term peace.’ 
 
‘Integration into NATO and the EU is 
Georgia’s sovereign choice, one which will 
strengthen Georgia’s security and ensure its 
stable development.’ 
 
‘Georgia aspires to become part of European 
and Euro- Atlantic structures, which will 
enable it to consolidate its democracy and 





Themes  Codes  Quotes  





Expectance for support      N/A 
 




Themes  Codes  Quotes  





Expectance for support      N/A 
 













Appendix 10. Content Analysis. (National Security Concept of Georgia 2019-2022) 
Questions:  
1. Does Georgia expect diplomatic/political assistance from a regional actor to solve its 
security challenge and/or threat, such as the EU, China, Russia? 
2. Does Georgia rely on diplomatic/political assistance from a regional actor to solve it 
security challenge and/or threat, such as the EU, China, Russia?  
The EU 








Reliance on support 
 




assistance    from an 
external actor to 
resolve the security 
issue/threat) 
‘ყოველივე ზემოაღნიშნულიდან 
გამომდინარე, არსებობს ახალი რუსული 
აგრესიის პოტენციური რისკი. თუმცა 
საქართველოსადმი გამოხატული 
საერთაშორისო მხარდაჭერა, მათ შორის 
ევროკავშირის სადამკვირვებო მისიის ყოფნა, 




ევროკავშირის სადამკვირვებლო მისიის 
საქმიანობა, ქვეყნის ხელისუფლებას მიაჩნია, 
რომ ამ მისიამ უნდა მოიცვას ოკუპირებული 
ტერიტორიებიც, როგორც განსაზღვრულია 
მისი მანდატით. ეს ხელს შეუწყობს 
სრულყოფილი სამშვიდობო პროცესის 





‘ქვეყანა არა მხოლოდ უსაფრთხოების 





მნიშვნელობას ანიჭებს ევროკავშირის უფრო 
აქტიურ ჩართვას რუსეთ-საქართველოს 
კონფლიქტის მოგვარების პროცესში.’ 
 
‘საქართველოსთვის პრინციპული 
მნიშვნელობა აქვს იმას, რომ ევროკავშირი, 
როგორც 2008 წლის 12 აგვისტოს რუსეთსა და 
საქართველოს შორის ცეცხლის შეწყვეტის 
შესახებ შეთანხმების შუამავალი, ეფექტიან 
ზემოქმედებას ახდენდეს რუსეთის 
ფედერაციაზე რათა მან სრულად შეასრულოს 
ნაკისრი საერთაშორისო ვალდებულებები და 




for support  
 




‘საქართველო ევროპული და 
ევროატლანტიკური სივრცის ნაწილია. 
შესაბამისად, მისი უსაფრთხოებისთვის 
მნიშვნელოვანია ევროპაში მინდინარე 




assistance    from an 
external actor to 
resolve the security 
issue/threat) 
და ევროკავშირის აღმოსავლეთით 
გაფართოება’  
 
‘საქართველო ესწრაფვის, გახდეს ევროპული 
და ევროატლანტიკური სტრუქტურების 
წევრი, რაც მას საშუალებას მისცემს 
მოახდინოს დემოკრატიის კონსოლიდაცია, 
ასევე განიმტკიცოს კეთილდღეობა და 
ეროვნული უსაფრთხოება.’  
 
‘ევროპულ და ევროატლანტიკურ 
ინსტიტუტებში საქართველოს ინტეგრაცია 
ხელს შეუწყობს კავკასიაში მშვიდობასა და 
სტაბილურობას, ეს კი, თავის მხრივ, 
განაპირობებს რუსეთის ფედერაციის 
სამხრეთი საზღვრების უსაფრთხოებას, რაც 
რუსეთის ინტერესიც უნდა იყოს.’ 
 
‘საქართველოს სუვერენული არჩევანია 
ჩრდილოატლანტიკური ხელშეკრულების 
ორგანიზაციასა და ევროკავშირში 
ინტეგრაცია, რაც განამტკიცებს ქვეყნის 








გაძლიერებას, უსაფრთხოების განმტკიცებას 
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Expectance for support 
     
(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s reliance on 
political/diplomatic 
assistance    from an external 




Reliance on support 
 
(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s expectation of 
political/diplomatic 
assistance    from an external 












Themes  Codes  Quotes  





Expectance for support    
 
(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s reliance on 
political/diplomatic 
assistance    from an external 




Reliance on support 
 
(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s expectation of 
political/diplomatic 
assistance    from an external 





Appendix 11. Content Analysis. (Foreign Policy Strategies of Georgia 2012-2018) 
Questions:  
1. Are Georgian incumbents aspired to become a member of a regional organization led 
by China, Russia and the EU? 
The EU 





‘ევროკავშირისა და ნატოს წევრობა 







(this code refers to 
Georgian 
government’s 
aspiration for the 
membership in the 
EU or NATO) 
და კეთილდღეობის უზრუნველყოფის 
უმთავრესი გარანტია, რომელიც ეფუძნება 
საქართველოს ცივილიზაციურ არჩევანს, არის 
ფართო საზოგადოებრივი თანხმობის შედეგი და 
გამყარებულია ქვეყნის კონსტიტუციით.’ 
 
‘საქართველოს ევროკავშირში გაწევრიანება 
წარმოადგენს საგარეო პოლიტიკის 
სტრატეგიულ მიზანს’ 
 
‘მნიშვნელოვანი ძალისხმევა მიმართული იქნება 
საქართველოს ევროკავშირში გაწვერიანების 
პერსპექტივის აღიარებისკენ.’ 
 
‘საქართველოს საგარეო და უსაფრთხოების 
პოლიტიკის მტკიცე და ურყევ მიზანს 
ჩრდილოატლანტიკური ხელშეკრულების 
ორგანიზაციაში გაწევრიანება წარმოადგენს.’ 
 
‘საქართველოს წლიური ეროვნული პროგრამის, 
როგორც ერთ-ერთი მნიშვნელოვანი 
ინტეგრაციული მექანიზმის ეფექტიანად 
გამოყენება, ნატო-ში გაწევრიანების პროცესის 




‘ქვეყნის ევროკავშირში გაერთიანების 
სტრატეგიული მიზნის მისაღწევად, 
საქართველო-ევროკავშირის ურთიერთობებში 










Aspiration for membership  
 
(this code refers to Georgian government’s aspiration for the 
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economic cooperation with 
a regional actor) 
 
Appendix 12. Content Analysis. (Foreign Policy Strategies of Georgia 2012-2018) 
Questions:  
1. Are Georgian incumbents aspired to become a member of a regional organization led 
by China, Russia and the EU? 
The EU 









(this code refers to 
Georgian 
government’s 
aspiration for the 
membership in the 
EU or NATO) 
‘ევროკავშირისა და ნატოს წევრობა 
საქართველოს უსაფრთხოების, განვითარებისა 
და კეთილდღეობის უზრუნველყოფის 
უმთავრესი გარანტია, რომელიც ეფუძნება 
საქართველოს ცივილიზაციურ არჩევანს, არის 
ფართო საზოგადოებრივი თანხმობის შედეგი და 
გამყარებულია ქვეყნის კონსტიტუციით.’ 
 
‘საქართველოს ევროკავშირში გაწევრიანება 
წარმოადგენს საგარეო პოლიტიკის 
სტრატეგიულ მიზანს’ 
 
‘მნიშვნელოვანი ძალისხმევა მიმართული იქნება 





‘საქართველოს საგარეო და უსაფრთხოების 
პოლიტიკის მტკიცე და ურყევ მიზანს 
ჩრდილოატლანტიკური ხელშეკრულების 
ორგანიზაციაში გაწევრიანება წარმოადგენს.’ 
 
‘საქართველოს წლიური ეროვნული პროგრამის, 
როგორც ერთ-ერთი მნიშვნელოვანი 
ინტეგრაციული მექანიზმის ეფექტიანად 
გამოყენება, ნატო-ში გაწევრიანების პროცესის 
ხელშეწყობის მიზნით.’   
 
‘ქვეყნის ევროკავშირში გაერთიანების 
სტრატეგიული მიზნის მისაღწევად, 
საქართველო-ევროკავშირის ურთიერთობებში 
ახალი დინამიკის შეტანა;’ 
 
China 
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government’s aspiration for 






Appendix 13. Content Analysis. (National Security Concept of Georgia 2012-2018) 
Questions:  
1. Is the Georgia government (formally) committed to liberal-democratic values?  
 









(this code refers to Georgian 
government’s formal 
statement to be committed to 
liberal-democratic values. 
Sub-codes: democratic values 
rule of law, civil rights) 
‘Freedom: The rights and freedoms of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms are recognized by 
Georgia and guaranteed by its Constitution. 
Georgia guarantees the rights and freedoms of all 
citizens and groups residing in Georgia, respects 
their right of free choice, guarantees the right to 
freedom of speech, thought, conscience, religion, 
and belief, and creates a favourable environment 
that enables each citizen to realize his or her 
potential. Georgia recognizes that economic 
freedom is a precondition for the realization of all 
other rights and freedoms.’ 
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‘Democracy and rule of law: Georgia adheres to 
democratic values and principles, and based on 
these, establishes a system of democratic 
governance in which state power is limited by 
law and distributed among the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches. Georgia ensures 
the rule of law, pluralism, and the protection of 
the rights of minorities, and seeks to strengthen 
civil society and other democratic institutions.’ 
 
Appendix 14. Content Analysis. (National Security Concept of Georgia 2019-2022) 
Questions:  
1. Is the Georgian government committed to liberal-democratic values?  
 









(this code refers to 
Georgian government’s 
formal statement to be 
committed to liberal-
democratic values. Sub-
codes: democratic values 
rule of law, civil rights) 
‘თავისუფლება: ადამიანის უფლებათა 
საყოველთაო დეკლარაციით, სამოქალაქო და 
პოლიტიკური უფლებების საერთაშორისო 
პაქტითა და „ადამიანის უფლეათა და 
ძირითად თავისუფლებათა დაცვის“ ევროპის 
კონვენციით გათვალისწინებული უფლებები 
და თავისუფლებები საქართველოს მიერ 
აღიარებული და გარანტირებულია მისი 
კონსტიტუციით. საქართველო 
უზრუნველყოფს მის ტერიტორიაზე 
მცხოვრები ყველა ადამიანისა და ჯგუფის 
საყოველთაოდ აღიარებული უფლებებისა და 
თავისუფლებების დაცვას, პატივს სცემს მათი 
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თავისუფალი არჩევნის უფლებას, 
უზრუნველყოფს სიტყვის, აზრის, სინდისის, 
აღმსარებლობისა და რწმენის თავისუფლებას 
და ქმნის ხელსაყრელ გარემოს თითოეული 
მოქალაქის შესაძლებლობების 
რეალოზებისთვის. საქართველო აღიარებს, 
რომ ეკონომიკური თავისუფლება 
პიროვნების ყველა სხვა უფლებისა თუ 
თავისუფლების წინაპირობაა.’ 
 
‘დემოკრატია და კანონის უზენაესობა: 
საქართველო დემოკრატიული 
ღირებულებებისა და პრინციპების 
ერთგულია და მათ საფუძველზე ამკვირდებს 
მმართველობის დემოკრატიულ სისტემას, 
რომელშიც ძალაუფლება კანონით არის 
შეზღუდული და განაწილებულია 
საკანონმდებლო, აღმასრულებელ და 
სასამართპლო შტოებს შორის. საქართველო 
უზრუნველყოფს კანონის უზენაესობას, 
პლურლისმს და უმცირესობათა, მათ შორის 
ეთნიკური და რელიგიური უმცირესობების, 
უფლებების დაცვას და ხელს უწყობს 
სამოქალაქო საზოგადოებისა და სხვა 
დემოკრატიული ინსტიტუტების 
გაძლიერებას.’ 
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